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SUMMARY STATEMENT 
This report summarizes deliberations over the Access to Essential Medicines held 
during a stakeholder dialogue process launched by the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) in 2001/2002. The dialogue process was 
designed to explore options of companies to address contested issues of intellec-
tual property in their business strategies. To that end, companies were exposed to 
the concerns of stakeholders and urged to define responses to these concerns. The 
project involved major companies and transnational non-governmental organiza-
tions as well as renowned experts in the field of intellectual property rights.  
This paper briefly sketches the sociological dimensions of the project that re-
late to issues of rationality and governance. It then describes in detail the setup and 
the course of the dialogue process. Major steps in the process were provided 
through comprehensive surveys of argumentation which integrated all points 
raised in the deliberations and fed them back to the participants. On the basis of 
such recursive communication the participants constructed “conclusions” that 
exhibit a considerable amount of argumentative flexibility and represent gains in 
rationality. However, the consensus reached in the dialogue process remained 
partial. It stopped short of “governance” in the sense of a binding decision on the 
contested subject matter. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Dieser Bericht stellt Verlauf und Ergebnisses eines Diskurses zum Thema Zugang 
zu wesentlichen Medikamenten dar, der in den Jahren 2001/2002 im Rahmen eines 
vom World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) initiierten 
Stakeholder Dialoges durchgeführt wurde. Der Dialog sollte prüfen, welche 
Optionen Unternehmen haben, den in der Öffentlichkeit geäußerten Kritiken am 
geltenden Regime des geistigen Eigentums durch Anpassung ihrer Geschäfts-
strategien Rechnung zu tragen. Beteiligt waren Vertreter von großen pharmazeuti-
schen Firmen, von transnational operierenden Nichtegierungsorganisationen, 
sowie Experten des Rechts des geistigen Eigentums.  
Der Bericht skizziert in Kürze die soziologischen Dimensionen des Projekts; 
diese betreffen Aspekte von Rationalität und Governance. Er beschreibt sodann 
im Detail Anlage und Verlauf des Dialogprozesses. Eine wesentliche Rolle spielten 
in dem Prozess umfassende Argumentationsbilanzen, in denen die Argumente aller 
Beteiligten zusammengefasst und an diese zurückgeleitet wurden. Auf der Grund-
lage solcher rekursiven Kommunikation konstruierten die Beteiligten dann 
Schlussfolgerungen, die ein erhebliches Maß an argumentativer Flexibilität offen-
barten und erkennbar Rationalitätsgewinne verkörperten. Allerdings blieb der im 
Dialog erreichte Konsens unvollkommen; er lag unterhalb von Governance, wenn 
man damit eine verbindliche Entscheidung über die umstrittenen Sachfragen 
meint. 
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1. The Project and the Issue: Globalization of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
In 2001 the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
launched a stakeholder dialogue project to engage transnational pharmaceutical 
companies and non-governmental organizations in deliberations over the proper 
role and limits of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the development of medical 
biotechnology. The project involved some 50 participants: representatives from 
companies and NGOs, experts in IPR and a number of observers from interna-
tional organizations and governmental bodies.1 
The WBCSD is a coalition of some 150 international companies sharing a com-
mitment to sustainable development.2 The WBCSD members considered their 
participation in the dialogue project as part of their broader efforts to find options 
for business strategies that meet the requirements of social, political, and ethical 
“sustainability”. Accordingly the focus of the project was what the companies 
themselves might contribute to resolve contested IPR issues, given the economic 
criteria under which they operate. 
Conflicts over IPRs have intensified in global economic and political relations, and 
particularly in the North-South context, since the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) came into force in 1995. The 
Trips Agreement requires all member states of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) to introduce minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property 
rights. The perspective that IPRs would have to be extended to and enforced in all 
countries raised great concerns that the developing part of the world might be 
further put at a disadvantage. IPR standards approximate to the relatively high 
level of IPR protection prevailing in industrialized countries might jeopardize the 
prospects of developing countries to benefit from the transition of modern socie-
ties to “knowledge societies” in which information becomes a crucial source of 
productivity and prosperity. Kofi Annan, in his 2000 Millennium Report to the 
United Nations, emphasized the prospects of the information economy for the 
developing countries: 
                                                 
1 A complete list of the participants is included in the final report of the project, see World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (ed.), Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology and Health-
care — Results of a Stakeholder Dialogue, Conches-Geneva, Switzerland: WBCSD, 2003, pp. 31-32. In 
electronic form, available from <http://www.wbcsd.org>. 
2 See <http://www.wbcsd.org>. 
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“… the capital that matters most in the digital revolution increasingly is intellectual 
capital. … The shift from hardware to software as the cutting edge of industry 
helps to overcome what has been a major impediment to development — the 
shortage of finance. … Clearly the requisite intellectual capital is not universally 
available, but it is far more widespread in the developing world and in the transition 
economies than is finance capital. … We in the policy-making world need to 
understand better how the economics of information differs from the economics of 
inherently scarce physical goods — and use it to advance our policy goals.” (2000, 
pp. 33-34). 
Comprehensive and stringent regimes of IPR protection appear to be at odds with 
high hopes that the transition to an information economy will propel the devel-
opment of poor countries. Such protection makes information that is “intellectu-
ally” available, which could, in principle, be shared without being consumed and 
multiplied at negligible costs, “economically” unavailable to a certain extent. 
Patents, in particular, withdraw information from the public domain to the extent 
that they reserve the right to exploit it commercially for the patent holder. 
On the other hand, IPRs are essentially compromise constructions. They are 
designed not only to reward individual inventors and provide returns on private 
investment in research and development, they are also intended to promote the 
creation of knowledge and technological innovation as social goals. Hence, IPR 
regimes imply safeguards, such as compulsory licensing schemes or public use 
exemptions, to guarantee the social utility of IP-protected knowledge. The TRIPS 
Agreement, too, refers conspicuously to the public interest and gives the contract-
ing states some flexibility to design IPR regimes in such a way that national re-
quirements of economic development, health policy, and public morality can be 
taken into account. Nevertheless, the obligation to impose “comparable” standards 
of IP protection restricts the flexibility of developing countries. And in the short 
run, at least, the developed countries of the North (and highly developed industries 
in newly industrialized countries), which hold the vast majority of patents issued 
worldwide, will benefit most from the globalization of IPRs. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement has 
exacerbated the North-South conflict. Existing inequities have tended to intensify, 
and this runs counter to the declared political will in both South and North. The 
perception of injustice is further fueled by the fact that the now developed coun-
tries, in their own economic histories, have dealt with IPRs in a very opportunistic 
way, by recognizing, interpreting, or applying such rights according to the impera-
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tives of their national interests. For example, many countries refused either to 
grant or recognize patents on drugs in order to build a national pharmaceuticals 
industry by enabling it to develop manufacturing capacities and acquire know-how 
by copying medicines. With the globalization of IPRs under the TRIPS Agree-
ment, developing countries no longer have similar options. 
The perceived injustice of the TRIPS Agreement and the “widening of the North-
South gap” play a major role in the public debates over IPRs. They also consti-
tuted the background for the deliberations in the stakeholder dialogue project. The 
topic that crystallized the issues most conspicuously was “Access to Essential Medi-
cines”. To ensure that patients have access to affordable drugs is no doubt a para-
mount goal of public policy. In view of the Declaration of Universal Human 
Rights, which includes a right to medical care, one may even say that governments 
have a duty to provide such access. To deny patent protection on drugs may be 
seen as means to discharge that duty. In fact, practically no developing country has 
until recently granted patents on drugs. It is precisely this situation that the TRIPS 
Agreement is intended to change. 
This report describes and summarizes the deliberations held in the in the stake-
holder dialogue on Access to Essential Medicines.3 We will briefly introduce some 
theoretical sociological assumptions underlying the staging and design of the 
dialogue process (section 2). These assumptions pertain to dialogue or discourse 
with encompassing participation as a reliable device to contribute to “governance” 
in the sense of binding decision making, on the one hand, and on argumentation 
as a means to promote “rationality” or as an effective medium of communication, 
on the other hand. We cannot give a full-fledged sociological account of the 
dialogue process in this report. But we want the reader to understand what moti-
vated the WZB team of social scientists to become involved in the organization 
and analysis of the project. The setup and the procedural rules of the dialogue 
process are presented section 3. The main purpose of the report is to describe in 
detail the communication process through which the participants proceeded 
during the course of the project (section 4). Major steps in this process were 
provided through comprehensive surveys of argumentation which integrated all 
points raised in the deliberations and fed them back to the participants. On the 
                                                 
3 The results of the working groups on Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Access to Human Genetic 
Resources were published earlier in this series of discussion papers; see van den Daele/Döbert/Seiler 
(2003), WZB Discussion Papers SP IV 2003-102 and SP IV 2003-107. 
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basis of such recursive communication the participants constructed the “conclu-
sions” that were integrated in the final report of the project (section 5). These 
conclusions exhibit a considerable amount of argumentative flexibility and repre-
sent gains in rationality. However, the consensus reached in the dialogue process 
remained partial and stopped short of “governance” in the sense of a binding 
decision on the contested subject matter (section 6).  
2. Theoretical Assumptions 
2.1 Global Governance and Civil Society Participation 
Capacity for governance in the sense of providing collectively binding decisions 
that regulate social conflict is a scarce resource. Even at the domestic level, trust in 
the regulatory competence of the nation state and the legitimacy of its regulatory 
efforts have been called into question in recent decades. Buzzwords like deregula-
tion and self-regulation, more participation, democratization, and the involvement 
of civil-society players are indicative in this respect.4 Government authorities have 
privileged rights of intervention and can act as arbiters (third parties) vis-à-vis 
conflicting societal forces. If this authority is not sufficient to ensure efficient and 
legitimate forms of societal control and if, for that reason, alternative mechanisms 
of governance have to be set up within the nation state, how much more urgently 
might such arrangements be needed in developing international institutions and 
regimes? For in this arena of conflict and negotiation the third party is conspicu-
ously absent. As a rule, intergovernmental, equal partners with veto power (indi-
vidual governments) have to reach comprehensive agreement. Normally, this 
requires extraordinarily protracted negotiation. At this global level it therefore 
seems especially plausible to try corporatist strategies, under which non-
governmental players from industry and the informal civil society area (NGOs) 
assume a kind of political mandate to give new impetus and shape to an emerging 
global order. This is the context for the discourse project we are discussing. 
“New impetus and shape” can be imparted only if the players/organizations 
involved have scope to act and are manifestly willing to use it. One of the reasons 
why the WBCSD was founded was to sort out such scope for action. The concept 
of an embedded economy is behind this endeavor. Although firms have to bow to 
                                                 
4 For a recent discussion of types of governance, see Kooiman (2003). 
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the imperatives of a competitive market economy, markets are not merely eco-
nomic arrangements linking profit-maximizing players. They are also communities 
where citizens meet who are guided by social, political, and cultural values over 
and above purely economic objectives. The extent to which these interests can be 
taken into account under the pressure of competition in a global economy may 
vary from case to case, and may also be a controversial issue. But there is wide 
agreement that the differentiation of the economy from politics, religion, and 
culture ought not and need not go so far as to leave no room for the ethical 
dimension of economic activities. 
In the case of intellectual property rights, companies must seek 
“to devise business strategies and use legal rights in such a way that they strike a fair 
balance between the need to protect intellectual property and maximize return on 
investment, on the one hand, and the need to provide access to new knowledge and 
distribute the benefits of innovation to the society — especially the developing 
countries — on the other”.5 
As indicated, intellectual property rights are supposed to bring private interests 
(incentives, rewards for inventors) into balance with public interests (research and 
innovation, economic growth and prosperity). If the economy is to be “embed-
ded,” the balance will have to be “right”, and this amounts to saying that the 
competing functional imperatives implied in IPRs have to relativize one another. 
If industry has to relativize the “profit” goal, the other side, the NGO sector, 
specializing on the public interest side of IPRs, must at least attempt to suspend 
one of its functional imperatives, namely orientation to mobilization and the con-
comitant reduction of complex situations to one-dimensional slogans, scandaliza-
tion, and blanket moral condemnation. For this reason the project proposal stated: 
“This implies … that non-governmental organizations are able and willing to en-
gage in limited taskforce-like cooperation in addition to and beyond strategies of 
protest designed to raise public awareness or encourage public resistance.” (p. 3) 
                                                 
5 Quote from the project proposal: “Issues of Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology and Informa-
tion Technology — Framework for a Stakeholder Dialogue Proposed by the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development,” March 2001, p. 4 (downloadable — see <http://www.wz-berlin.de/ipr-
dialogue/framework.pdf>). 
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Not only were participants in the planned dialogue process aware of this demand 
for considerateness and flexibility, they had postulated it and expected to be able 
to cope with it — at the latest when deciding to take part. However, these expecta-
tions define no more than minimum conditions for a successful process of under-
standing or negotiation, because what concessions to the other side are finally to 
be made under the pressure of argument cannot be known at the beginning of the 
dialogue process. Discourses, as Piaget once put it, are “methods that lead ‘God 
knows where’” (Piaget, 1928, p. 237). And this openness implies a discourse risk: In 
entering into a discourse, one runs the risk of reaching a point where one’s own 
position is thoroughly undermined (cf. van den Daele/Döbert, 1995). This risk is 
often underestimated and it is almost necessarily underestimated. After all, a 
person who decides to participate in a discourse must consider his or her own 
position well-founded and legitimate, and is therefore likely to underestimate the 
strength of opposing positions. 
But what happens if the discourse turns against interlocutors and threatens to 
dismantle crucial positions? “Normal” regulatory agencies (governments) often fail 
to reach a solution in such cases. Can one expect that alternative conflict resolu-
tion procedures such as a stakeholder dialogue will fare any better in this respect 
— not only occasionally but, due to their mode of operation, systematically, 
predictably, and replicably? We do not believe that this is the case. It is not by 
chance that attempts to ease the burden of courts through arbitration proceedings 
have largely failed. The reason is that win-win solutions tend to be the exception in 
conflicts. Genuine compromise, on the other hand, produces action costs: the parties 
have to renounce something. In a representative setting participation costs must be 
added: participants who are willing to impose action costs on themselves are 
bound to confront criticism from their clientele/organization.6 Therefore, consen-
sus will be not the likely, but the unlikely result of a dialogue process. 
The argumentative outcome of the process may nevertheless be evident to observ-
ers. Action and participation costs that could deter participants from further 
cooperation may only become clear at the end of the discourse when the final 
balance of the argumentation begins to emerge. Until then the process continues 
unaffected by the fear of costs that might be implied in the results of argumenta-
                                                 
6 See van den Daele/Döbert (1995) and Döbert (1996b) for an analysis of the various “costs” implied in 
discourse participation. 
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tion. In the end, the participants may have to declare dissent or discontinue par-
ticipation, defying the argumentative pressure they have helped to build up, and 
which proves them wrong.  
The debate over the TRIPS Agreement may, on the other hand, not be a case 
where solutions reached through argumentation put excessive costs on one side. 
Since international agreements, as we have indicated, are brought about only in 
unanimity (or in the absence of a veto from even a single signatory country), they 
can scarcely be other than compromise constructions. This being the case, it would 
be astonishing if there were no interpretations of the agreement that distribute the 
costs of conflict resolution more evenly and permit the conflict parties to come 
together. 
Given these ambivalent perspectives and expectations, the goals of the pending 
dialogue process were cautiously formulated and kept somewhat ambiguous in the 
project proposal: 
“In practical terms, the objectives of the project must be modest. Basically, it will 
be up to the participants to decide what they want to achieve and what they con-
sider as success or failure of their efforts. One clear aim is to produce an input into 
the RIO + 10 conference in July 2002, to be presented in a common session by 
companies and stakeholders at that conference. The input could be both substan-
tive and procedural. The participants should perhaps try to clarify problems and 
policy options for selected issues of IPR, and assess cases in which new solutions 
have been tried. If they find common ground, they might recommend revisions of 
or amendments to existing IP regimes. This would include examples of what com-
panies could do, what governments should do, and what the possible role of civil 
society actors (NGOs) might be. Where the participants disagree, they might at 
least try to define an agenda for future discussions and indicate whether they think 
that new forums are needed to deal with the open questions.” (pp. 4-5) 
Only the actual course taken by the stakeholder dialogue process can show how 
much governance civil society can generate through such arrangements. The 
formulations used in the project proposals allowed participants to define dissent, 
too, as a success of their efforts, to produce only procedural proposals, and to 
postulate further forums. This would clearly have been no more than a modest 
contribution to finding new forms of governance, because the process would stop 
short of implementable arrangements. “Input into the Rio + 10 conference” 
would have to be somewhat more ambitious, possibly including “revisions of or 
amendments to existing IP regimes.” If such proposals could be agreed on, there 
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would be greater justification in describing the dialogue process as a contribution 
to global governance. 
2.2 The Power of Argumentation: Rationality and Selection 
The stakeholder dialogue process involved the participants in a discourse, that 
proceeded through extended exchanges of arguments over the conflicted issues. 
Those who invest time and effort in such a discourse, obviously, share the assump-
tion that arguments matter. They presuppose that reasons must be given for claims 
and positions, that such reasons can be valid or invalid, and, hence, an assessment 
is possible whether the claims and positions are well-founded or unfounded.  
While these presuppositions may have been uncontested among the participants of 
our stakeholder dialogue they are fundamentally called into doubt by some variants 
of constructivist philosophy and sociology. We cannot discuss these variants here 
in depth. But we will elaborate on them to the extent necessary to understand why 
we, nevertheless, feel justified to defend the position that arguments matter — both 
with respect to descriptive and to normative judgments.  
At the center of the debate is the role of “truth” in social processes. Max Weber 
once remarked that the truth of interpretations can be a factor of the highest 
causal relevance, because the success or failure of a course of action often depends 
on the truth of the definition of a situation. It is difficult to imagine how societies 
in general, let alone modern societies dependent on permanent technical dyna-
mism, could survive if they were unable to distinguish between truth and false-
hood, sense and nonsense, illusion and reality. Implicitly or explicitly, policy 
decisions in the technology field make numerous assumptions about how tech-
nologies work, about their physical, biological, economic, and social impacts. One 
reason why technology assessment has been institutionalized is to permit this 
complexity to be at least partly mastered. Social scientists cannot analyze technol-
ogy policy controversies without assessing the knowledge claims made in such 
controversies. More generally, they cannot make statements about the future of a 
society without assessing the knowledge held in the society. Such assessment 
implies more than just registering from an observer’s perspective which claims 
various social actors put forward. The analyst must grapple with the validity of 
these claims. For that matter he/she must explore the ocean of arguments dis-
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played in the field of observation and try to reach what John Rawls called a well-
considered personal judgment in reflective equilibrium and sort out which claims 
make sense and which not.7 
Naturally, such efforts only make sense if a distinction can indeed be drawn 
between sense and nonsense. However, this possibility is fundamentally denied by 
constructivist epistemologies that denounce ideas of objectivity or truth as “naïve”, 
since all knowledge must be considered as “constructed” or “socially constructed”, 
depending on the state of individual or social consciousness as modified by in-
compatible conceptions of the world/cosmologies. Such notions have been 
inspired, for instance, by the writings of von Foerster (1981), Maturana (1982), von 
Glasersfeld (1987), Luhmann (1984) and Douglas et al. (Douglas/Wildavsky, 1982) 
They inflate the undeniable empirical fact that social actors differ in their views 
and frames of interpretation into the epistemological and cosmological premise 
that such differences are irreducible and that the actors live in separated worlds. 
Another (by no means new) premise of the constructivist credo is that the mind 
can only have to do with its own states. The distinction between internal and 
external, consciousness or reality must be inferential, and thus an “internal” con-
clusion. The premise may go unchallenged, but it needs to be explained how the 
mind can “escape” from its reflexive loops and circularities when people function 
in shifting environments.8 In their present state these epistemologies tend to end 
up with relativism; they preclude any understanding of the objectivity and inter-
subjectivity of cognition, and they do not stand the test of applicability to them-
selves. 
                                                 
7 The public media typically operate without such a sorting mechanism. As a rule, journalists have neither 
the time nor the forum for an adequate assessment of the arguments raised in political controversies. So 
they are either forced to rally behind the slogans of one party or (if they seek a balanced presentation) to 
juxtapose the arguments of all sides without any selection in terms of well-founded/unfounded. In such 
unselective argumentation games, sense and nonsense have an equal “chance of surviving”, and this 
gives rise to endless circulation of “pro” and “con” in different forums. 
8 If reality can only be accessed through inferences the question, is how cogent such inferences are. One 
touchstone of the notion of the brain as a closed system is probably perception. We construct “percep-
tion machines” and call them perception machines only if they satisfy certain requirements, the most 
important of which perhaps is the capacity of the machine to adapt its moment-to-moment shifting 
behavior to its environment. As the brain of the machine is held constant, the behavioral shifts must be 
attributed to its environment. Von Foerster’s statement — “The environment contains no information. 
The environment is as it is.” (1981, p. 270) — is misleading. When we talk of perception, we imply 
information from the environment; otherwise, there is no perception.  
 The solution is already implied in Plato’s cave parable which suggests that we are inescapably impris-
oned within the cave of our cognitive apparatus, but we do see the shadows of objects “out there”. The 
subjectivity of consciousness is thus anchored in an objective world. 
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We cannot not go into the details of constructivist epistemologies. We wish only 
to point out that the premises for these epistemologies, the diversity of ideational 
content and its dependence on consciousness, have long been known and taken as 
a challenge for notions of objectivity and truth — not as a reason to do away with 
them. Interpretations that amount to arbitrariness and solipsism, and do not stand 
the test of self-reflexivity are, as a rule, relegated from this philosophical debate.  
In particular, the cognitivist psychologist Jean Piaget, to whom we owe the tenet 
“all knowledge is constructed” and who is therefore often cited, cannot be claimed by 
any of variant of relativist-solipsistic constructivism (cf. Sutter, 1999). Although 
Piaget rejected Kant’s answer to the question of how our knowledge can “fit” 
reality (Kant’s answer being: through the a priori categories of human understand-
ing), the question was fundamental to all of his thought. And so he provided a new 
answer to the problem of rationality of action and objectivity of knowledge: our 
ideas and actions “fit” reality because in the course of development they are made to 
fit. This is in principle the answer given by evolutionary epistemology, too. Hence 
the typical developmental changes identified by Piaget can and do serve as a model 
for explicating rationality and objectivity in such a way that not all constructions 
have to be accepted as “equally valid”.  
Let us take a look at a classical Piaget experiment and at the changes in “construc-
tions” that can be observed. The task is to predict the behavior of a balance beam 
(tilting to which side?) on which a varying number of weight units have been 
placed at discrete positions (see Miller, 1986). The formula “units of distance times 
units of weight” permits a precise prediction of the beam tilt. The youngest chil-
dren pay attention either only to the weights or only to the distance, and naturally 
often predict wrongly. Somewhat older children know that weight and distance are 
important and try to combine the two parameters: sometimes weight is the crucial 
factor, sometimes distance (differentiation). Finally the exact formula (units of 
weight times units of distance) is construed and the tilt of the beam becomes 
perfectly predictable. In radical/social constructivist terms, the findings would 
have to be described as follows: Some construe in a “weight frame”, others in a 
“distance frame,” and still others use a “sometimes-sometimes” construction, 
while a last group uses a multiplication schema. All these constructions occur 
empirically and have to be respected as equally valid constructions of reality or 
world views. The children who actually do the construction see it quite differently: 
For once they have acquired the multiplication formula they reject other construc-
tions as deficient. 
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We would like to be able to join them and insist that one can check whether 
arguments are founded or unfounded, and, hence, distinguish (rationality from 
rationalization) in societal discourses. Now it must, of course, be immediately 
admitted that the problems that arise in major societal and technology-policy 
controversies cannot, without further ado, be compared with the determinist 
behavior of a balance beam. But “without further ado” does not mean “not at all.” 
To give an example from a comparable discourse project that dealt with the risks 
of genetically engineered herbicide resistant crops. One risk assumption is that 
excessive herbicide dosages will be applied because crop plants are resistant. This 
risk perception refers to just one dimension, to the technology side of herbicide-
resistant crops. It reflects, if you wish, a technological construction or cosmology. 
The view that denies the risk applies an economic construction or cosmology: since 
herbicides cost money they will be used sparingly and there is therefore no risk of 
over-dosage. In the discourse, both views were integrated: Agriculture is technol-
ogy under economic constraints. The argumentation therefore developed towards 
a conclusion along the lines: if herbicides are not extremely cheap the technical 
possibilities of over-dosage are not exploited for economic reasons. Thus, eco-
nomics times technology equals actual herbicide application. This is the fully 
comprehended balance beam with distance times weight, and this construction is 
similarly superior to one-dimensional constructions.9 
Such transition from one-dimensional to multi-dimensional analysis is often 
provoked in discourse because the dimension ignored by one group is introduced 
into the debate by other groups focusing on complementary dimensions As one 
would expect, comparable effects were apparent in the discussion on access to 
essential medicines. To take just one example: patent protection is essentially price 
protection. If only the legal possibilities are considered, globalizing patent protec-
tion for medicines is therefore tantamount to increasing prices, making drugs 
inaccessible to poor countries. This naturally provokes normative and moral 
criticism of the TRIPS Agreement. This moral criticism presupposes the empirical 
fact of material price increases. But an empirical increase in prices cannot be 
evaluated without looking at another legal dimension of the problem — the rights 
of governments as opposed to patent holders under patent law (special conditions) 
— and at the economic dimension of de facto price fixing by producers (differen-
                                                 
9 See van den Daele/Pühler/Sukopp, 1996, pp. 123-140. 
  – 12 –
tial pricing, i.e., discounts for countries with low purchasing power). Statements 
about access to essential medicines that take account of only one of these dimen-
sions do not correspond to the fully comprehended balance beam and, in this 
sense, cannot be regarded as “well-founded”. They ignore part of the system’s 
actual mode of operation, and, given this state of affairs, whoever insists that the 
views of all parties are equally rational world views or constructions in this context 
claims that the correct perception of a problem is just as rational as its simplifica-
tion or suppression.  
Gains in rationality in Piaget’s sense may be possible with respect to descriptive 
constructions of reality. However, what is true of description need not necessarily 
be true of normative aspects. In view of the plurality of values and norms, it seems 
easy to be convinced that argumentation in this area must remain ineffective— not 
least of all because the methods of demonstration and persuasion that the descrip-
tive sciences apply do not operate in the normative field. Social constructivists 
from the so-called “cultural theory”10 assume that people become committed to 
“cosmologies” and values in accordance with their position in the social structure. 
Such cosmologies are incompatible and collide in irreconcilable conflict., These 
assumptions do have a degree of plausibility in the field of value conflicts. Actually, 
two of the types described by the theory — egalitarians and hierarchists — seem 
to be identifiable in the discussions on access to essential medicines. “Egalitari-
ans”, exemplified by activists of social movements, invoke the universal, equal, and 
indivisible human right of access to medical care, which is to be applied without 
regard to international regimes like the TRIPS Agreement. “Hierarchists”, exem-
plified by administrators and regulators, insist, in contrast, on the prevailing prop-
erty system, admitting only adaptive modifications to be implemented by experts. 
There can be no doubt that argumentation on normative issues operates in a gray 
area, so to speak, because people and groups can to a certain extent choose their 
life plans and values. But arguing with absolutely no prospect of success is highly 
unlikely. If we assume that societal values and norms are at least partly linked with 
basic societal functions, the non-performance of which would in the long run 
prevent society from reproducing, then each value must stand the test whether the 
manner in which it is realized is compatible with the realization of the other 
fundamental values. One is thus automatically operating in a multi-dimensional 
                                                 
10 See Thompson, Ellis, Wildavsky 1990. 
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value space, and every “construction” or “cosmology” that relies exclusively on one 
value finds itself under argumentative pressure. “Health,” the value that egalitari-
ans dramatize in the case above, must, as the debates on intellectual property rights 
have shown, be brought together with, for example, property and legal reliability, 
with justice, with gains in scientific knowledge, with technical innovation, eco-
nomic development, and with the public interest commitments of government 
authorities. A “well-founded” bundle of legal and non-legal strategies most apt to 
achieve this “bringing together” must therefore be the aim of the discourse. This 
would provide at least minimum criteria for rationality or, as the case may be, 
rationality deficiencies. What is at issue can, however, be ascertained only by 
getting to the bottom of a societal argumentative constellation, by compiling all 
relevant arguments and leading them towards conclusions. 
Arguments over normative issues may not reach a result and it may prove impos-
sible to draw conclusions because of insufficient knowledge about legal conse-
quences, economic conditions, or technical background, or because the interpreta-
tion of the legal situation itself is contentious. Gray areas and uncertainty allow for 
a variety of possible “constructions”. It is, however, unlikely that normative 
controversies end up as totally undecidable. If we assume that from the multitude 
of arguments that relate to a controversy finally, say, ten arguments can be ex-
tracted that are not disputed by any party, then each of these ten arguments will act 
as a filter through which every possible interpretation of the given issue has to pass 
to be considered acceptable. If ten such “filters” exist, it is unlikely that several 
equal, similarly rational constructions will “survive” the selection process.  
Argumentation in a discourse includes phases of variation and selection. The 
participants will begin with adding and compiling points and views to contested 
matter, but they will then proceed to check evidence, work on inconsistencies, and 
integrate arguments. Radical constructivists who claim that all “constructions” of 
people and groups are equally valid because they are socially relative and irrecon-
cilable tend to draw their evidence entirely from the variation phase of controver-
sies. In this phase, there can by definition be no well-considered judgment because 
argument and counterargument, sense and nonsense are still competing without 
distinction and assessment by the participants. The true meaning of contests over 
perception and of values will only be understandable, if sociology pays equal 
attention to the process of selection. Such analysis is bound to rehabilitate notions 
and criteria of rationality that are valid beyond groups and individuals. The materi-
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als presented in this report allow the reader to check what the discourse of the 
stakeholder dialogue achieved in this respect.11 
3. Procedural Setting and Course of the Dialogue Process 
It is clear that a discourse can only produce an accepted outcome if it complies 
with accepted rules of procedural fairness. Unfair processes produce unfair out-
comes, which will be rejected and not included in effective regulatory arrange-
ments. If the discourse risk runs against a particular party and argumentative defeat 
is imminent, the party will evade conclusions on substantive matter with formal 
grounds if the procedures are flawed — for instance, if the participation is unbal-
anced, if the proceedings lack transparency, or the steering of the process is biased. 
This section describes in detail how the stakeholder dialogue took shape and 
proceeded. The WZB team was mandated with the task to organize the process. 
The obvious task was to observe the norms of discourse and all standards of 
procedural justice. Parties are supposed to cope under such conditions with out-
comes of the process that may not meet their expectations (Lind/Tylor 1988). On 
the other hand, no amount of procedural care constitutes a guarantee that parties 
will accept a loss of crucial arguments and not then decry the procedure as unfair. 
In this case, observers will be able to judge whether such criticism is a rational 
argument or a rationalization.12 
Under real conditions no discourse can ever be ideal. Time, for instance, is always 
too short to scrutinize all the arguments raised to the very end. Therefore, it is 
hard to see how a dialogue process like the one organized here by the WBCSD and 
the WZB can be immune to procedural criticism. This potential trap can be 
avoided only if as much process and outcome control as possible is shifted to the par-
ticipants themselves. Ultimately it should be the participants who decide on con-
tents (What is to be discussed?) and the social aspects (Who is to take part?) of the 
discourse. The participants should define the limits of the process and agree on 
procedure (process control). Similarly, at the end of discussions, they should seek 
to formulate conclusions that reflect possible consensus, remaining dissent, and 
future discussion needs (outcome control). Complete transparency must be en-
                                                 
11 For an analysis of the stakeholder dialogue process along these lines, see van den Daele/Döbert (2004). 
12 In the discourse project (participatory technology assessment) on herbicide-resistant crops mentioned 
earlier rationalization processes (allegations of procedural flaws) set in to cover up and “explain away” 
argumentative defeats (cf. Döbert, 1996, p. 2). 
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sured throughout, as well as the right to demand modifications to proceedings and 
decisions at all times. Under such conditions, all the pragmatically necessary 
strictures on discourse idealization are the responsibility of the participants them-
selves, so that almost all criticism of the process turns, in effect, into self-criticism. 
These terms of discourse were offered to participants with the invitation to take 
part in the dialogue. To ensure that the wishes and demands of those invited could 
be met to the fullest possible extent from the very start, an initial survey was 
conducted on what expectations there were with respect to a successful or accept-
able discourse.  
Three main points emerged from the survey:  
(1) The process should be socially and objectively representative (all impor-
tant groups should be represented and all relevant arguments should be 
taken into account).  
(2) On this basis, it should provide more than a reiteration of known posi-
tions; argumentative mobility and a readiness to accept compromises 
were demanded.  
(3) And, finally, it should be ensured that the final report take due account 
of and give adequate space to dissenting minority opinions.  
Points 1 and 2 can be combined in the postulate that the discourse should ulti-
mately produce a well-considered judgment in reflective equilibrium in the sense of 
Rawls (1971) and as envisaged in the theory underlying the project (see section 2.2 
above). The philosophical construct of comprehensive rationality thus finds 
colloquial expression and constitutes the intuitive aspiration of the lay philosopher, 
too. 
The participants entered the discourse on the premise that a distinction can be 
drawn between reasonable and unreasonable judgments. Despite the plurality of 
opinions and value judgments and the semi-institutional relativism that prevail in 
modern society they committed themselves to rely on the force of the good argu-
ment that persuades everyone. Such commitment implies that argumentative flexibil-
ity is considered a realistic option; it is ascribed to oneself and to the others in the 
discourse. The test for the force of good arguments and for argumentative flexibil-
ity comes, however, only when arguments and counterarguments are synthesized 
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into conclusions. Thus, by implication, the participants were aware, that they must try 
to reach conclusions.13 
In real discourses approximations to the ideal rules of discourse must suffice. In 
addition, there are pragmatic restrictions with which the participants must agree. 
The most important restrictions in the stakeholder dialogue project were the 
setting up of an executive body — the Steering Committee — the forms of par-
ticipation, and the role of the WZB team. 
With some 50 participants, it is neither always possible nor necessary to ponder 
every procedural detail in the full circle. There are good but never optimum dates 
for conferences. Non-scheduled opportunities for face-to-face meetings present 
themselves and should be taken.14 Care must be taken that discussions proceed in 
a more or less orderly fashion and that sights are held steady on a possible confer-
ence outcome. As decisions must constantly be made, a Steering Committee — 
with a balanced membership — was proposed and confirmed by participants at 
the opening conference of the dialogue without notable conflict. One of its main 
tasks was to prepare a tentative final report. This was to be done in a fiduciary role 
and in constant consultation with participants. The invitation to the dialogue had 
this to say about the role of the Steering Committee: “… it should not be its role 
to define the results of the project and draw conclusions in its name” (project 
proposal, p. 11). Whatever rules are followed, the setting up of an executive body 
always means differential opportunities to exert influence and a certain extent of 
delegation — unavoidable, and therefore legitimated and agreed limitations to 
idealized discourse.15 
The next restriction concerned the form of participation. Discussion among 
physically present participants cannot be fully replaced by any form of indirect 
                                                 
13 In the project technology assessment of herbicide-resistant crops, a proposal was put forward to avoid 
conclusions and leave the opposing positions as they stand. Not only does this proposal contradict the 
very idea of a discourse, it also suggests that the authors have little in the force of their own substantive 
arguments. In the stakeholder dialogue, it was common understanding among the participants that 
conclusions should be aimed at.  
14 Thus the WZB team used the 2001 meeting of a CBD ad hoc group in Bonn to organize a special 
session of some members the working on Protection of Traditional Knowledge, although such meeting 
had not been agreed upon by all participants. 
15 Members of the Steering Committee were: Carlos Correa, University of Buenos Aires; Thomas Cueni, 
Roche Pharmaceuticals; Wolfgang van den Daele, Social Science Research Center Berlin; Johnson A. 
Ekpere, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; Maurice Iwu, Bioresources Development and Conservation 
Programme, Burkina Faso; Achim Seiler, Social Science Research Center Berlin; Patricia Solaro, Aventis; 
Ross Stevens, World Business Council for Sustainable Development. 
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communication. Divergent reactions to theses, leaving uncomfortable arguments 
out of account, and rationalization of all sorts can always be directly attacked by 
the opposing side before an audience of observers — uninvolved participants — 
whose presence exerts additional “pressure.” But discussion rounds would need an 
enormous amount of time to compile, sort, and conclusively process all relevant 
arguments of the IPR issues under examination. For most participants, processes 
like the present one come on top of their professional commitments — as a rule 
they cannot simply abandon their other duties. Time not money is the really scarce 
resource of “participation.” There is therefore absolutely no hope — especially for 
a body with international membership — of “extorting” the conference time 
participants need for the careful consideration of so complex a matter as intellec-
tual property rights. Three forms of participation were therefore proposed: 
(1) participation in an introductory conference in Montreux (May 2001) and 
a final conference in London (February 2002),  
(2) the specification of relevant literature paradigmatically incorporating the 
position taken, and  
(3) participation in a permanent “electronic discourse” in the form of reac-
tions (E-mail) to circulars in which the WZB team summarized the status 
of discussion at a given point in time.  
The combination of these forms of participation proved extraordinarily helpful. 
For without the combination it would have proved impossible to prepare argu-
mentation balances on the controversies at issue that could do justice to partici-
pants’ demand to gather all arguments without exception.16  
Furthermore, the outcome of the conference — the conclusions — would have 
had to be greatly simplified without the electronic discourse. For in the course of 
exchanging E-mails, partial areas of consensus emerged which — for reasons of 
time and owing to the absence of important participants — could not be dealt with 
at the final conference in London. In the final report, all areas of consensus were 
summarized and, with permanent feedback from participants, put into as accept-
able a form as possible. 
                                                 
16 For example, the important contributions by the NGO, Oxfam, to the overall results are based 
throughout on the literature they supplied and on E-mails. 
  – 18 –
Finally, the role of the WZB team can be interpreted as a restriction on idealized 
discourse, since it contained an element of delegation: preparatory information 
management for the project had to be delegated to the WZB because controver-
sies of this sort generate masses of arguments in a very brief space of time (up to 
100 pro and contra arguments) which without professional support would overtax 
the data processing capacity of the human mind (H. A. Simon 1969). On this point 
the project proposal states:  
“The WZB will document and analyze ongoing discussions in and contributions to 
the project. Documentation and analysis will serve to explicate and relate arguments 
put forward by the group, to determine subsequent working steps, identify open 
questions and tasks, and stimulate and organize feedback among participants.” 
(project proposal, p. 12)  
The resulting material on “access to essential medicines” is to be presented below. 
As far as the form of this documentation is concerned, the WZB team proposed 
that the points raised by the participants and the documents consulted be con-
densed into “argumentation trees” which dissect contested issues into sub-issues, 
to each of which blocks of pro and contra arguments are assigned. These blocks 
can be worked through in sequence and only their outputs (sub-conclusions) have 
to be kept in mind at the next level of inference. Argumentation trees appear to 
reflect the way the human mind operates; great complexity has to be dealt with 
sequentially. The argumentation trees were supposed to produce the concentration 
and clarity the participants needed to reach a verifiable judgment in reflective 
equilibrium. 
An argumentation tree containing up to 100 arguments still makes great demands 
on the reader, and can even have a deterrent effect. There were regular complaints 
about information overload. The participants — each of them a specialist for only 
a sub-block of arguments — were probably unaware of the amount of information 
they would get when they demanded a compilation of all relevant arguments on all 
sub-issues. To counter these complaints, “condensed versions” of all argumenta-
tion surveys were prepared, so that the material to be worked through at the final 
conference was reduced to about 30 pages — still a great deal, perhaps too much 
to permit orderly conclusions to be drawn at a conference without additional 
structuring. Therefore, “rapporteurs” were appointed for the three Working 
Groups from among the participants, whose task it was to prepare the transition to 
  – 19 –
conclusions by extracting possible consensus lines from the documents on the 
argumentation in the dialogue process. 
The following scheme summarizes the steps taken in the course of the dialogue 
process. The documents relating to these steps and the evolution towards the final 
conclusions are presented in subsequent sections. The long versions of the argu-
mentation trees can be found in the appendix. 
4. Access to Essential Medicines: Circulars to the Participants 
4.1 Introduction 
Among the tasks of the initial conference of the project (Montreux) was to settle 
the final circle of participants. It was agreed to include about 50 representatives of 
public authorities, companies, and non-governmental organizations from Europe, 
STEPS IN THE IPR STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS 
March 2001 Framework for a Stakeholder Dialogue Proposed by the 
WBCSD 
May 2001 First Conference (in Montreux, Switzerland) 
Up to February 2002 Circulars to the participants (surveys of arguments from 
the First Conference and related documents) 
Responses to the circulars 
Synthesis of responses to the circulars and points to 
consider for conclusions 
Steps towards conclusions (proposals to be considered for 
the final report at the Second Conference) 
February 2002 Second Conference (in London, United Kingdom) 
Up to July 2002 Proposals for the Final Report based on the proceedings of 
the London conference 
Responses to the proposals, revisions, additions, dissenting 
opinions 
July 2002 Final Report of the Dialogue Process to the WBCSD 
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North and South America, India, and Africa who were known to be acquainted 
with (aspects of) the subject matter at issue. This prior knowledge of participants 
made it possible to keep the circulars updating the status of argumentation rela-
tively brief. The relevant international agreements, definitions, and safeguards, the 
“functioning” of intellectual property rights, could be taken as known in outline. 
Had the circle of readers been broader, this would not have been necessarily the 
case. But, of course, the actual proceedings of the project are based on this more 
or less implicit knowledge of participants and cannot be understood without it. It 
will therefore be useful to start by sketching the overall architecture of the TRIPS 
Agreement and briefly explaining less obvious technical terms. The focus is on the 
implications of the TRIPS provision that national legislation must provide patent 
protection for medicines. 
In essence, patents for medicines, like all patents, confer on the holder the right to 
prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing a 
product and/or using a process. This time-limited monopoly allows for higher 
prices and increased profits which can be used in return to recoup R & D and 
investment costs, thus accommodating the interests of innovators/inventors. 
Higher prices imply, of course, a higher hurdle for access to drugs, a hurdle that 
can prove too high, especially for patients in developing countries without a 
functioning public health system. But patent law generally tries to establish a 
compromise between private and public interests, and the TRIPS Agreement was 
also designed as a compromise construction in which the protection of private 
interests is expected to be compatible with and, in fact, supportive of public 
interests (including moral values and health policy objectives). To a certain extent 
it is assumed that public interests would be served more or less automatically. 
Thus, patents reward innovation and encourage innovative activities; and this 
should expedite economic growth and scientific progress (in societies that take part 
in the patent system). Other public interests can be taken into account through 
mechanisms explicitly built into patent law to constrain and mitigate the monopo-
listic effects of IPRs and prevent their abuse. 
These mechanisms have been dealt with in the deliberations of the stakeholder 
dialogue under the heading of “safeguards”. The most important (and most 
controversial) of these safeguards is the option of the state to grant compulsory 
licenses for the use of patents. In the context of health policies this may mean that 
generics can be manufactured without the consent of the patent holder. The 
TRIPS agreement defines several conditions under which compulsory licenses can 
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be granted; among them: when there is a health emergency (e.g., an epidemic) and 
when drugs are to be distributed freely (on a non-commercial basis) in the national 
health system. In these cases the use of a patented subject matter under a compul-
sory license requires adequate remuneration of the patent holder.  
As to the scope of protection, there is also considerable latitude both under patent 
law and under TRIPS. Especially the question of national or international exhaus-
tion has been left open in TRIPS (see Art. 6). “Exhaustion” means that the right of 
the patent holder to restrict the use of the patented products ends once these 
products have been brought to the market with the consent of the patent holder. 
This means, for instance, that the products can be sold to and legitimately used by 
third parties. The open question is whether such exhaustion operates on a national 
or international scale. In the latter case products that are legally available in one 
country can be sold to and used in any country. Accordingly, developing countries 
in need of medicines, which they could not manufacture without consent of the 
patent holder, could source all markets to which such medicines have been lawfully 
introduced and import them from there at the lowest available price without 
consent of the patent holder (parallel imports).  
The relevance of these safeguards for access to essential medicines should be 
assessed in the context of supplemental strategies on cost reduction that can be 
adopted by governmental or private players. Two of these supplemental strategies 
address the use of patent law. The one is that patent holders grant voluntary licenses 
to manufacture patented drugs for specific markets. The other one is that drug 
companies file patents only for specific markets (differential filing). For  example, 
patents could be filed only for rich countries of the North, in which high drug 
prices can be achieved that cover the costs of drug development, leaving the 
patented subject matter freely available in other countries. Other supplemental 
strategies address drug prices directly or indirectly. The most important one is 
differential pricing. Patent holders can lower drug prices for poorer countries with 
less purchasing power. This strategy bears the risk that governments in the rich 
countries take note of the lower prices elsewhere (referential pricing) and exert 
pressure for comparable discounts to relieve their health budgets. Differential 
pricing therefore depends on intransparency of markets or on a declared political 
will to establish a global system of differential pricing and to abstain from referential 
pricing. Since companies are aware of the risk of referential pricing they prefer 
strategies which improve access to medicines in poorer countries but leave official 
drug prices unaffected: they combine drug purchases with gifts (e.g., one pack is 
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sold, three are added as a gift) or they operate with rebates on the purchase price 
(purchase-donation combinations and reimbursements). 
There is far-reaching agreement that the protection of intellectual property has to 
be aligned with broader issues, which include access to medicines and affordability 
of drugs for poorer countries, on the one side, and the need to recoup high 
investment costs for drug development, on the other. There is consensus that, so 
far, R & D costs have largely been borne by the countries of the North — and met 
through correspondingly high prices. Hence, all supplemental strategies in favor of 
developing countries, as well as the safeguards mentioned, are subject to one core 
constraint: the markets of the North have to be protected against low-priced 
medicines from the South by market segmentation. This requires northern countries 
to implement a system of national exhaustion in order to prevent re-imports of 
patented drugs from low-price countries. And it requires northern governments to 
abstain from referential pricing, i.e., taking prices in developing countries as their 
reference — whether through governmental cost controls in the health system or 
price negotiations as major buyers (bulk purchases). Without market segmentation in 
this sense, R & D could not be protected. 
The aforementioned safeguards and strategies may still not suffice to grant access 
to essential medicines in poor countries in every case. In some regions not even 
pure gifts of drugs would be of any use, since the public health system cannot cope 
with distribution. Developing capacities with the aid of international funds must in 
these cases be given priority. An integral part of this context of poverty, under-
development, and lacking health care is the problem referred to as “neglected dis-
eases”. With the exception of international funds, all the measures listed presuppose 
that some sort of markets exist in which R & D costs can be recaptured. In the 
case of worldwide diseases, these are doubtless the markets of the North. How-
ever, there are specific diseases that occur only in developing countries where the 
purchasing power is negligible. These are “neglected diseases” — “neglected” 
because hardly any money is spent on research into them. Since the economy can 
solve societal problems only when markets exist, public funding is imperative in 
these cases. To ensure the optimum use of funding, “purchase precommitments” have 
been proposed (e.g., a commitment on the part of the WHO to purchase a large 
quantity of the drug to be developed to combat a neglected disease). 
This concludes the introduction and explanation of technical terminology. The aim 
has been to show the dimensions that have to be taken into account in assessing 
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the impact of patent protection required under the TRIPS Agreement on access to 
medicines. The effects of patents must be evaluated by taking into account existing 
legal safeguards and “supplemental strategies” companies may apply. Furthermore 
it must be considered that patent protection is granted for a limited time and that 
many essential medicines are already off-patent. Equipped with this background 
information, the reader unacquainted with the subject matter should now be in a 
position to follow the course of argumentation in the dialogue project. 
4.2 Survey of Arguments 
The dispute on access to essential medicines has a descriptive and a normative 
aspect. On the one hand, it is concerned with whether and to what extent the 
TRIPS Agreement and the resulting globalized obligation to introduce patents for 
drugs is a significant causal factor for (inadequate) access to essential medicines 
and the global crisis of health care systems. On the other hand, there is contro-
versy on whether the TRIPS Agreement violates key values, rights, and standards 
of equity both in how it came about (procedure) and in its legal substance. A 
circular on the state of argumentation was prepared for each of these sub-
complexes. The argument surveys printed below are the final, corrected, and 
supplemented versions. They include all corrections and improvements deriving 
from the E-mail dialogue, correspondence, and conference discussions. In this 
supplemented form they underpin the conclusions. 
As far as the form of the argument surveys is concerned, it should also be pointed 
out that the issues that dominate the trees were chosen to produce as little branch-
ing as possible. It was feared that complex branching would be difficult to manage 
by E-mail. For the same reason many sub-references — i.e., sub-controversies 
within an argumentation field — were not marked, in confidence that participants 
would be able to grasp how they related. It should be noted that the contra side of 
argumentation fields — unlike the pro side — logically contains very heterogene-
ous information and assertions: thus the heading “Contra/Rel” for “con-
tra/relativizations.” This is because assertions can be attacked for a wide range of 
reasons: because they are false, irrelevant, or valid only in special circumstances. 
For example, the assertion that compulsory licenses are the safest path to afford-
able drugs can be attacked by pointing out that this possibility has been hardly ever 
used in actual fact, that differential pricing is better, or that there are hardly any 
medicines for which a generic substitute is not available. The goal assertion 
(“compulsory licenses …”) is undermined by counterarguments in very different 
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ways, and for this reason they are subsumed under the heading “Contra/Rel”. 
Such a structure would not be suitable for every scientific purpose. Here, too, it 
was decided to condense multiplicity for reasons of workability. 
Now to the argument surveys. Each consists of a brief exposition of the issue 
followed by a “condensed” and a “long” version of the state of argumentation. 
The “long” version was to be relegated to the appendix for the same reason the 
condensed versions were prepared in the first place: the complexity would put the 
reader off. At the end of the circulars (or sections of them), a number of questions 
were formulated in order to stimulate participants to prepare the possible conclu-
sions. 
The first circular on essential medicines (5th Circular) ran as follows. 
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IPR Dialogue Working Group III (Access to Essential Medicines) 
 
5th Circular: 
IP Regimes and Access to Health Care, Part One 
(Rainer Döbert) 
Arguments: IP and Drug Prices 
(condensed version) 
A. Introduction 
Lack of access to essential medicines is an element in the health crisis that threatens 
many countries in the poorer parts of the world. Access to medicines is affected by 
many factors, IPRs (especially patents) being just one such factor. In this respect a 
broad consensus exists among representatives of the most different organizations. 
Controversial issues are the exact relevance of patents, i.e. the extent to which they 
actually affect access to medicines and whether such impact warrants (or requires) 
the revision of current regimes of intellectual property, especially of the TRIPS 
agreement.  
The assessment of the relevance of IPRs has a factual dimension and a normative 
one. In the factual dimension crucial questions seems to be whether patents because 
they lead to higher prices will make essential medicines unaffordable for poor people. 
In the normative dimension, the question is whether, because of such impact, patents 
on medicines violate the basic human right of access to healthcare or other legal 
obligations or moral duties. 
We will postpone the survey of normative arguments to a later Circular. There we 
will deal with questions raised with respect to the meaning and the status of a human 
right to healthcare. To whom does one appeal in demanding that such a right be 
upheld? Government, private companies, fellow citizens? What happens if this right 
clashes with other rights such as property? We may also have to discuss whether 
other normative principles must be invoked to underpin access to healthcare, for 
instance, obligations of responsibility. And we will include the questions whether the 
TRIPS agreement should be revised because it is unjust from the very beginning. 
The present 5th Circular surveys the discussions over the relation between patents, 
drug prices and access to medicines. It also covers the discussion over measures to 
mitigate or avoid negative impacts of patents on the access to medicines. In this 
respect the participants (and the documents consulted) addressed a number of 
safeguards normally built into IP regimes, such as compulsory license or parallel 
imports. The participants discussed how these safeguards can be used (and redes-
igned) under the TRIPS agreement. In principle, conceptions could range from 
denying patents for medicines altogether to making even stronger provisions for IP-
protection (TRIPS plus). The participants also referred to supplemental strategies, 
that might function as equivalents to those safeguards: differential pricing, donations 
etc. Some of these strategies (international funds, new health policies) require 
interventions from the public sector, governments or WHO. 
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The existence and interpretation of safeguards offered within the IP regime and the 
availability of supplemental strategies which may substitute those safeguards are 
conditions clearly to be taken into account for the question whether current legal 
regimes, especially TRIPS, must be revised if one is to cope with negative impacts of 
patents on access to medicines. 
The participants expressed divergent views and preferences with regard to the options 
implied in various safeguards and supplemental strategies. This divergence reflects 
(among other factors) different notions of how the conflicting objectives can be 
balanced that must be met in pricing medicines produced by private companies: 
Prices should be low enough to make medicines affordable for the poor, and they 
should be high enough to provide incentives for investment in R & D to create these 
medicines in the first place. Thus, the impacts of patents on access to medicines may 
be looked at from a short-term or a long-term perspective. In the short term patents 
may reduce access by impinging on the prices of medicines so as to make them 
unaffordable for those in need. In the long term, they may increase access by induc-
ing research that will lead to new effective drugs. There seems to be broad consensus 
among participants that both sides of the coin—the long-term and the short-term 
effects—must be somehow taken into account in designing and assessing the regime 
of IP. We include arguments that have been raised in this respect in our survey. … 
The arguments surveyed in this CIRCULAR relate only to the “factual dimension” of 
access to essential medicines.∗ 
B. Arguments: IP and Drug Prices 
In the following we summarize main arguments on whether IPRs (especially patents) 
will have a negative impact on access to healthcare because they lead to higher prices 
for essential medicines. The arguments address three topics: 
1. The relevance of patents for the prices of medicines and the relative weight 
of patents (and patented drugs) among the other factors that determine ac-
cess to healthcare? 
2. The options to avoid or compensate negative impacts of patents on drug 
prices by applying the “safeguards” offered within the IP-regime or by us-
ing appropriate “supplemental strategies”. 
3. The need to balance drug prices with the protection of private investment in 
R & D that creates new medicines 
                                                 
∗ For reasons of redundancy, a table has been omitted here. 
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Question (1) Do patents preclude access to healthcare because they lead to high 
(unaffordable) prices for medicines in poor countries? 
[Numbers in brackets refer to the list of full text arguments in the long version file; 
R-numbers refer to responses to the circulars] 
NO/not necessarily  YES 
   
a. Drug Prices and Other Factors   
1. Access to healthcare is determined by a 
many factors. IPRs and drug prices are 
not the most relevant factor—compared 
to factors connected with government 
responsibilities, e.g., widespread poverty 
and healthcare policies [1, 4, 8, 9, R5:1, 
R5:6, R5:7]. 
 2. Other factors are relevant. But patent 
abuse leads to unaffordable prices of 
medicines, and these prices are or be-
come the bottleneck if the other relevant 
factors are complied with [2, 3, 5, 7]. 
b. Price Effects of Patents   
3. Retail prices for medicines are not the 
prices set by the pharmaceutical indus-
try. On the whole medicines are not 
cheaper medicines in countries without 
IP protection [5, 6, 7, R5:4]. And recent 
price diminution were agreed upon 
without modifying the patent status of 
medicines. [R5:4] 
 4. Higher prices belong to the essence of 
patents; the “patent multiplier” (generic 
price × patent factor = brand price) 
seems to range somewhere between 2 
and 4 [14, 15, 16]. Other cost factors 
(distribution) can be equally high. 
c. Off-patent Drugs and Competition   
5. Most essential medicines are off-patent, 
and patented drugs face competition 
which will drive prices down. [R5:4] 
The current discussion on IP and access 
to healthcare is ill-directed because it 
refers to HIV which is a special case 
(new disease) [17, 20, 21].  
 6. Price comparisons demonstrate 
“monopolistic pricing practices”. HIV is 
not so special. New drug resistances are 
spreading, and will generate dependency 
on new, patented drugs. Competition by 
substitutes is restricted by drug proper-
ties (e.g., different immune responses by 
patients) [18, 19, 22]. 
  7. Patents on drugs may have a limited 
impact, but when peoples lives are at 
stake that impact is too much [18, 19]. 
d. Overriding influence of poverty    
8. To make drugs affordable for the poorest 
is beyond the market, special means 
(public funds) are needed [23, 24]. 
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Further Questions: 
1.1 Which arguments have to be added to gain a well-considered judg-
ment on the controversial issues? 
1.2 In view of the fact that patenting and higher prices are essentially in-
terrelated, what remains as the real focus of the controversy? What 
follows from this? 
1.3 If industry lowers the drug prices to increase access to essential medi-
cines governments may take this as an excuse for not fulfilling their 
own duties to contribute to the solution of the problems (and vice 
versa). How can this be prevented?  
Question (2) In view of the various safeguards and supplemental strategies that 
are available to lower drug prices and make medicines affordable 
are compulsory licensing and parallel imports the best instru-
ments? 
YES  NO, not necessarily 
   
Compulsory Licensing (CP) and Parallel Imports (PI)  
9. If the safeguards of CL and PI are 
interpreted in a broad manner, which 
means: not bound to narrow “excep-
tional circumstances”, they will guaran-
tee affordable drug prices and access to 
medicines in the long run [26, 28, 32]; 
especially when the private sector is 
included [36]. 
 10. CL and PI are not routine solutions; 
there are factual (advanced industry) 
and procedural restrictions. In addition, 
Article 31 of TRIPS circumscribes at 
least the types of grounds to be ap-
plied—e.g., extreme urgency, public use 
[27, 33, 34]. 
11. It contradicts the TRIPS Agreement 
when governments and industry exert 
pressure not to use CL and PI, and when 
they try to implement stricter rules than 
envisaged by TRIPS (TRIPS-plus) 
through bilateral agreements [29]. 
 10a. In developed countries CL was in no 
case necessary to overcome health cri-
sis; in developing countries the issue of 
drug distribution would still be unre-
solved [R5:4].  
13. Lower drug prices came only after 
threat with CL [47a]. And only by CL 
will be possible to determine the lowest 
price [R5:5] 
 12. Industry and governments in industrial 
countries are changing their positions; 
they accept the safeguards. Use of the 
safeguards is not, however the preferred 
policy. Negotiated solutions are better 
[30, 31], as recent reductions of prices 
for medicines demonstrate [47]. Prices 
will be even lower when more public 
money comes in [35]. 
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YES  NO, not necessarily 
   
15. [Product quality] is a problem of control 
and reinforcement of law [41, 46], gen-
erated partly by the high prices of pat-
ented drugs [42]. 
15a. Illegal exports are manageable [Oxfam 
2001]. 
 14. In addition, CL and PI are connected 
with counterfeiting and substandard 
products [40]. They will yield little 
benefit for patients [43] and result in 
illegal exports to the developed world 
[45], because they are a strategy of 
industrial development not of access to 
medicines for the poor [R5;4].  
17. CL and PI should also be practiced in 
the developed countries [37]. They 
could be combined with a 1% R & D 
tax on generics and 5% royalty for com-
panies that have provided the R & D 
[39]). 
 16. Unrestricted CL and PI will drive prices 
down to marginal costs with no margin 
left for R & D [38]. A frequent use of 
CL will destroy the IPR system [R5:7]. 
16a. CL an IP should be combined with 
other measures and applied according to 
stage of economic development 
[R5:12]. 
16b. Industry prefers CL as compared to PI 
because it requires a health emergency, 
local manufacturer and fair royalties to 
patent holders. [R5:6]. 
Voluntary Licenses and Public Funding   
19. Even voluntary licensing may not work 
in all cases. The commercial production 
presupposes markets which do not exist 
for medicines in many poor countries. 
Without markets we need systems of 
public funding [50, 51] and public-
private partnership.  
 18. In view of the overriding health disaster 
of HIV one should not discuss narrow 
IP interests but instead grant voluntary 
licenses to the WHO or to anyone who 
wants to use them. [48]. 
18a. Poor countries would get essential 
medicine credits in exchange for biodi-
versity conversation [R5:1]. 
18b. Public private partnership is not a sus-
tainable solution [Oxfam 2001]. 
20. If we link commercial standards of drug 
production with the human right of 
access to medicines the question of 
funding inevitably comes up and of 
compensation for the company that is 
supposed to grant a voluntary license. Is 
the global community prepared to pay? 
[52, 54]. 
 21. Once it is acknowledged that licenses 
should be granted one can discuss how 
the needs of public health and fairness 
to industry can be balanced in CL [53]. 
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YES  NO, not necessarily 
   
Differential Pricing   
23. CL is better than differential pricing 
because it is sustainable, steady and not 
open to manipulation in difficult nego-
tiations [57, 59]. 
 22. A global system of differential pricing 
based upon a worldwide classification 
of markets and guidelines for pricing 
which also applies to generics and is 
backed by formal agreements would be 
more efficient in terms of transaction 
costs (bargaining) and prices (90% or 
below) than any results of CL [56, 58, 
60, 61, 62]. 
25. Market segmentation is difficult to 
defend, it will break down. [64, 65]. 
25a. A general policy would not be work-
able, inter alia for antitrust reasons 
[R5:4]  
 24. Differential pricing presupposes effect-
tive segmentation of markets [63, 66]. 
Differential Filing (Proposal of Lanjouw∗)   
27. “Differential filing” contradicts TRIPS 
and the US law. And it overestimates 
the role of patents for access to medi-
cines [69, 72]. 
28. “Differential filing” undermines the 
incentive system of patents because it 
restricts the markets for the pharma-
ceutical industry. The advantages for 
the generic producers are not justified, 
they don not contribute to the develop-
ment of new drugs [67, 71]. 
28a. Differential filing is workable only in 
combination with market segmentation 
which is up to now not ensured [R5:4].  
 26. For specific diseases prevalent mainly 
in developing countries stronger patent 
protection may be needed. However, 
there is no need to have strong patent 
protection in developing countries for 
medicines to treat global diseases which 
affect all people. Here profits realized in 
rich countries suffice to protect invest-
ment in R & D. Companies could file in 
rich countries only and let unrestricted 
generic competition evolve in poor 
countries. This could easily be done by 
formulating the “foreign filing license” 
appropriately [68]. 
Further Questions: 
2.1 Which arguments have to be added to gain a well-considered judg-
ment on the controversial issues? 
2.2 Safeguards and supplemental strategies can be combined. Are all 
combinations possible? E.g. differential pricing and parallel imports, 
or more flexible compulsory licensing and parallel imports? Which 
mix seems to be best? 
2.3 How can “tiered pricing” be turned into a sustainable strategy? 
                                                 
∗The Lanjouw proposal was published after “Montreux”; the WBCSD introduced it together with some comments of 
the industry. We take this as a valuable contribution. 
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2.4 Countries can be classified as developed, developing and least devel-
oped. What safeguard/supplemental strategy serves the interests of 
which type of country best? 
Question (3) Is strong patent protection a necessary condition for having a 
pharmaceutical industry with high investment in R & D? 
YES  NO/not necessarily 
   
29. Patents are imperative for the pharma-
ceutical industry because the financial 
risks of developing new products are 
enormous and copying products is easy 
[R5:4]. The contribution of the public 
sectors is small [R5:9]. In fact, countries 
without product patents do not invest in 
R & D [73, 75]; accordingly, TRIPS will 
lead to a globalization of research efforts 
on neglected diseases [79]. 
 30. Higher than normal profits of the 
pharmaceutical sector show that the 
financial risks can’t be too high. These 
profits have largely been realized at a 
time when many developing countries 
did not recognize product patents [74, 
84, 86]. In addition, poor countries will 
not be able to contribute to higher reve-
nues [Oxfam 2001] 
32. Patents are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition. Where markets do not exist, 
one must rely on funds [81] and, among 
other things, biodiversity credits [R5:1]. 
States’ failure is the main cause of lack 
of access [R5:6]  
 31. South Africa and Chile [R5:8] had 
strong patent protection but did not 
attract investments and did not invest 
into neglected diseases, because there 
was no market [80]. 
33. Developing countries will attract 
investments into the pharmaceutical 
industry if patent protection becomes 
stronger [77] and profitability rises [90, 
R5:4] 
 34. There is little evidence of an increase in 
investment. Different forms of intellec-
tual property may be required in differ-
ent stages of industrial development. 
That is one lesson to be learnt from the 
history of developed countries: They 
introduced patent protection when their 
companies were ready to innovate 
[R5:8]. India built up a strong generic 
pharmaceutical industry without product 
patents. The development of such indus-
try may be a by-product of compulsory 
licenses. [76, 78].  
35. Unrestricted use of compulsory licensing 
would drive prices to marginal costs 
without compensation for R & D [83]. 
Research activities would diminish 
under pressure of generic competition 
without patent protection [R5:7].  
 36. Investment could be protected by a right 
to compensation, e.g. a 5% royalty and a 
1% tax on generics [R5:5], not by a right 
to exclude others from the use intellec-
tual property [82]. 
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Further Questions: 
3.1 Which arguments have to be added to gain a well-considered judg-
ment on the controversial issues? 
3.2 If there is no controversy about the need to protect investments, how 
do we get closer to a delimitation of legitimate margins? 
3.3 Under which conditions could strong product patent protection con-
tribute to the development of new drugs for neglected diseases? 
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The circular on the normative dimension (8th circular) ran as follows (the 
overviews from the earlier 5th circular which were reproduced at this point have 
been omitted). 
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IPR Dialogue Working Group III (Access to Essential Medicines) 
8th Circular: 
Part Two: Access to Health Care and IPRs — The Normative Issues 
(Rainer Döbert 02-01-02) 
Arguments: Access to Healthcare and IPRs — 
The Normative Issues 
 
(condensed version) 
Introduction 
This Circular addresses the normative dimension of the conflict about access to 
essential medicines. There is bitterness in the debates about the TRIPS Agreement 
and this has to do with the fact that not only interests, but also values and norms, are 
at stake. The respective normative arguments pertaining to the TRIPS Agreement can 
be subsumed under three headings: human rights, “care” or “responsibility”, and 
injustice. 
The Declaration of Human Rights grants to everyone, among other things, the right to 
medical care, including the right to essential medicines. As plausible and as convinc-
ing the respective right may look at first glance, as many uncertainties arise at the 
second. Its exact meaning is far from clear in view of the fact that—as a positive, 
“social” human right—the right to healthcare and essential medicines presupposes the 
consumption and spending of resources that may be owned by others like the 
medicines that are owned by the pharmaceutical companies. Does one have a human 
right to a company’s property—at least to that part of its property that is partly in the 
public domain? The Declaration of Human Rights does not imply this, because it 
specifies unequivocally States or governments as addressees of human rights claims. 
But, again, the question arises as to how far States’ duties reach, in view of budgetary 
bottlenecks. 
In view of these contingencies, some participants proposed to distinguish between 
strict human rights claims and mere policy goals. Others denied the applicability of 
the human rights terminology in the context of access to medicines altogether, but 
even these did not deny any moral duties of companies. Instead, they proposed to 
construct them not as human rights, but as implications of our general moral duty to 
help, namely, as “care” and “responsibility”. 
The whole picture is complicated by the interplay of public and private goods in the 
field of healthcare. If governments have the duty to further the public good, “access 
to healthcare”, could this not imply among other things, a duty to tailor the regulatory 
framework of companies in such a way that companies could not but contribute to the 
public good by offering affordable prices for their private goods (medicines)? Here is 
where compulsory licensing and parallel imports come in. This line of reasoning is all 
the more convincing, if one keeps it in mind that TRIPS will oblige some govern-
ments for the first time to grant product patents on medicines. And, among them, in 
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the short run, will be some which will not benefit from the system of IPRs at all, 
namely, the least developed countries. One way to take care of the special needs of 
the least developed countries could be a global system of differential prices, a system 
that would also be compatible with an imperative, under which the whole system of 
healthcare also operates: funding, especially of R & D.  
The introduction of norms is always connected with a distribution of burdens and 
benefits of cooperation (gains and losses), and this distribution of gains and losses is 
hardly ever in the equal interest of all concerned. “Property” divides people into 
“haves” and “have-nots”, and the introduction of this institution divides societies into 
those who did not (developed countries) and those who will have to respect the rules 
(developing countries) while still in the process of development. Will the less 
privileged accept all this without any form of pressure or any form of compensation? 
Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that many of the arguments raised against 
the TRIPS Agreement pertain to inequalities and injustice in procedure (participation 
and pressure), in outcome (colonialism by the North, for example), and in application 
(litigation costs, for instance). Their relative weight will, in the final analysis, 
probably depend not least upon the value one attributes to the IPR system on the 
whole. 
In the following, the arguments of participants will be presented under the three 
questions:  
1. Do patents on essential medicines violate the human right of access to 
healthcare? 
2. Do companies have moral obligations to contribute to the solution of 
the health crisis in developing countries? 
3. Is the IPR system (TRIPS) flawed because injustice and unfairness are 
built into it? 
Normative issues in the debate over IP protection (and TRIPS) 
1. Do patents on essential medicines violate the human right to 
access to healthcare? 
PRO  CONTRA/REL 
1. Access to medicines is a basic human right 
defining a strict duty of States to reduce the 
price of essential drugs, even if this means 
breaching international trade agreements (1, 4, 
5) that do not generate “an environment of 
responsibility”(R8:6, R8:12). 
 2. Not companies but States are addressees of 
human rights and there can be no fundamental 
right to medicines, because these are complex, 
invented private goods. They are objects not of 
basic, but of aspirational rights or policy goals, 
which can be and are overruled by the 
budgetary constraints of States (2, 3). 
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PRO  CONTRA/REL 
3. In this respect, compulsory licensing and 
parallel imports are of vital importance, but 
they are denied and undermined by bilateral 
agreements (6). And Doha has still to be 
implemented (R5:6). 
 4. The safeguards in TRIPS are now accepted 
and reaffirmed in Doha (7, R8:6). 
5. The patent system has to further the public 
good of equal access to medicines for all; 
otherwise its legitimacy is questionable. 
 6. As long as incomes are distributed 
unequally, medicines cannot be affordable to 
everyone. If they are to become a public good, 
a purchaser has to buy them as private goods 
and can then offer them, for instance, in health 
promotion programs as part of a public good 
(8, 10; cf. Circular 5, safeguards and supple-
mental strategies). 
  7. The public goods corresponding to the 
patent system are information and R & D. 
9. Rights are just social constructions, which, 
especially in the case of IPRs, make little 
sense: Advancing knowledge does not create 
property, and TRIPS confuses the inclusive 
human right with the exclusivity of property 
rights (15, 16, 18). 
 8. The protection of property, including 
intellectual property, is a human right, too, and 
not at all a completely new one. In the past, 
societies have tried to evolve mechanisms of 
exclusion, too, in order to allocate benefits to 
“traditional inventors” (14, 17, R8:6). 
10. The International Undertaking for Genetic 
Resources demonstrates that one can success-
fully allocate benefits „to the whole society“ 
(19). 
 11. Even if companies accept “design[ing] the 
issues as a human rights issue”, implying 
obligations for themselves, two question 
remain unresolved: Where are the limits of 
companies’ responsibilities, implying, among 
other things, a dividing line between essential 
and less essential medicines? And, how should 
especially R & D be funded, if not by 
additional public money? (20, 21, 22, 23) 
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2. Do companies have obligations to contribute to the solution of the health crisis 
in developing countries? 
PRO  CONTRA/REL 
12. Even if there is no strict human right to 
medicines, pharmaceutical companies have 
duties to contribute to a solution of the health 
crisis: They are part of the healthcare system 
and accept the corporate responsibility 
connected with this fact—all the more so, as 
they are confronted with the moral convictions 
of their shareholders and employees. If one 
adds to this responsibility the principle of 
“ability to pay”, one ends up with a global 
system of differential prices, which offers 
medicines to the least developed countries at 
cost prices (24, 25, 27). In addition, contribu-
tions to international funds and drug donations 
are part of this corporate responsibility (R8:6)  
  
3. Is the IPR system (TRIPS) flawed because injustice and unfairness are built 
into it?  
a. Participation and Pressure 
PRO  CONTRA/REL 
13. The whole negotiation process of the 
TRIPS Agreement was „flawed“ because there 
was too much influence from powerful 
industries, no representation of the least 
developed—especially African—countries, too 
little time to acquire the relevant expertise, 
and, in addition, a lot of coercion (28, 29, 31, 
33). Thus the TRIPS Agreement will have to 
be re-negotiated (R8:12) 
 14. WTO decision-making is generally based 
on unanimous consent and therefore not as 
one-sided as people believe. The flexibility 
(safeguards) of the TRIPS Agreement, owing 
to a “tough battle”, are proof of the relative 
fairness of the procedure. Admittedly, there 
are some shortcomings having to do with 
lacking expertise of delegations or with time 
constraints leading to an undue extension of 
“Western concepts” (30, 32). 
15. The flawed process can only result in a 
flawed product: TRIPS is one “simple system 
of neo-colonialism” that neglects cultural 
differences and imposes Western ideas to 
which the West will not even stick when “it is 
no longer in their interest” (34, 35).  
 15a. The mere exploitation of inventors by 
society can also not be “morally right” (R8:6). 
15b. Even if IPR is not a western concept, its 
implementation is biased (no adequate balance 
between social needs and private profits, no 
benefit sharing for TK)(R8:6)  
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b. Inequalities and Development 
PRO  CONTRA/REL 
16. TRIPS—unlike other agreements within 
the WTO—is based on a one-size-fits-all 
approach, which denies the right to develop-
ment; this is because the early phases of 
industrialization depend on copying technolo-
gies of more advanced countries. Therefore 
different IP systems adapted to different stages 
of industrialization are needed and available 
(e.g., copyright; 36, 37). But they are not used, 
and the safeguards are being undermined 
(bilaterialism; 39, R8:8, R8:12). 
 17. Cf. Circular 5: Research and Development: 
Benefits for inventiveness are needed. The 
only resource which poor people have is their 
knowledge (R8:6). 
18. The provisions/safeguards of the TRIPS 
Agreement, just reaffirmed in Doha, guarantee 
the necessary flexibility (38, 40). 
16a. In developing countries , the introduction 
of patents does not foster the domestic 
industry, but international companies and 
endangers at the same time public health. This 
has been different in advanced countries (36a, 
R5:8)  
  
16b. TRIPS violates the principle of reciproc-
ity of international trade, because it leads to 
high rent transfers to industrialized countries 
without reciprocal benefits for developing 
countries (R8:8). To come to an acceptable 
balance rent transfers should be used for R6D 
in neglected diseases (R8:8)  
  
19. The uniqueness of genetic information 
precludes “inventing around”, and it is used to 
block genuine competition from generic 
products—and all this based on minor 
inventions (41). 
 20. Compare: Gene Patenting, Circular 9. 
21. Generic competition is often unfair 
competition (cf. Circular 5, compulsory 
licensing; 43). 
c. Other Normative Infringements 
PRO  CONTRA/REL 
22. One element of unfairness relates to 
appropriations of benefits from nothing (minor 
inventions), the public domain (discoveries), 
or from other people’s work (farmers who 
selected and conserved germ plasm; traditional 
knowledge; 44, 46, 49). There should be 
severe penalties for these kinds of abuses of 
patent law (R8:6). Cf. Section on TK  
 23. “Inventiveness” and “discovery” can be 
defined by each country on its own standards; 
and patents based on public domain knowl-
edge can be revoked (45, 47). 
24. To revoke a patent is extremely costly, as 
the whole system is too costly for poor 
countries (46, 52) and small inventors (R8:6). 
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25. There are many unkept promises with 
respect to technology transfer, and instead of 
investments, one observes de-investment (50). 
 26. It’s too early to make an assessment (51). 
25a. To balance the TRIPS agreement 
concessions with respect to textiles and 
agricultural products have been promised. 
These promises were also not kept.  
  
Further Questions: 
1. What arguments are missing or inadequately stressed? 
2. How far can the moral duties of companies reach in view of the fact that compa-
nies have to be profit oriented? 
3. What division of labor should obtain between States and companies with respect to 
the moral duty to improve access to healthcare? 
4. Is there a need to confine proposed solutions to essential medicines and how are 
these to be defined? 
5. Are (inclusive) human rights and (exclusive) property rights to be treated on the 
same level? 
6. Would there still be normative criticisms of the IPR system if safeguards plus 
differential pricing were implemented? 
7. If TRIPS implies an “undue extension of Western concepts” and a neglect of the 
“cultural dimension”, which aspects would have to be changed and how? 
8. The assignment of property rights is, by definition, connected with inequalities and 
exclusion. What are the reasons for classifying these implications as injustice? 
9. Is the “right to development” compatible/incompatible with IPRs? 
10. What mechanism should be used to improve access to the whole IPR system (in 
terms of costs, for instance, of filing, revoking) for the poor (countries)? 
11. Which other questions should be posed?  
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4.3 Steps Towards Conclusions 
The circulars contained questions addressed to participants. The answers received 
by E-mail were summed up and passed on to participants in “Steps Toward 
Conclusions” to give them an idea of the direction taken by the discussion. Since a 
completely new “supplemental strategy” had meanwhile begun to influence the 
international discussion, namely differential filing, and since the totality of 
safeguards and supplemental strategies with their differing strengths, weaknesses, 
and functions offered a highly complicated picture, participants were again sent a 
systematizing overview. The aim was to permit appropriate fine tuning of 
international IPRs in the context of other measures. The material distributed is 
printed below. 
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IPR Dialogue Process 
Steps Towards Conclusions 
Part II.1: Access to Healthcare 
With this communication, we try to come a bit closer to conclusions that might be 
drawn from the dialogue process, pertaining to the issues of Working Group III: 
Access to Essential Medicines (AEM). This is Part II.1 on IP and Drug Prices; Part 
II.2 on Normative Issues will follow.  
Arguments referring to IP and Drug Prices were surveyed in the 5th Circular. Twelve 
participants responded to this Circular. Their responses, which also consist of first, 
tentative conclusions, will be inserted into the respective “argumentation tree”. 
(These responses are also documented in the members corner of the project website.) 
The first part of this communication (A) gives you a rough summary of points raised 
in the participants’ responses. The second part (B) comprises a survey of safeguards 
and supplemental strategies designed to improve the balance between public and 
private interests in the IPR system. In the third part (C) we ask you to propose 
conclusions. For that matter we suggest that you follow the leading questions in 
Circular 5.  
Please read the statements presented in the following as participants assessments, not 
those of the WZB. 
(A) RESPONSES FROM THE PARTICIPANT 
General Remark 
We have set up a condensed and a long version of the state of argumentation and 
have also tried to group arguments into “chapters”. But condensing and grouping 
arguments have a price: condensing entails abstraction and possibly a certain selectiv-
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ity of emphasis; grouping may insinuate an independence of blocks of arguments that 
goes too far. To give just two examples: “Factors connected with government 
responsibilities, e.g., economic and healthcare polices” in the condensed version may 
be too abstract a formulation to transport the full meaning of arguments 1 and 2 in the 
long version, touching upon poverty, inequality and States’ failures. And, of course, 
in the final analysis, price effects of patents (1b) cannot be discussed adequately 
without reference to R & D (3). A part of the participants’ responses result from the 
dangers of abstracting, condensing and isolating sections, which can be overcome just 
by stressing these dangers and emphasizing the fact that the condensed version was 
designed to serve as an aid for the memory, and that it is not the “full meal”. Now to 
the details! 
Leading Question 1: 
Do patents preclude access to healthcare because they lead to high (unafford-
able) prices for medicines in poor countries? 
1.1 Which arguments have to be added to gain a well-considered judgment on the 
controversial issues? 
In this connection, it is reaffirmed that there can be no R & D without price protec-
tion. But despite this, IPRs—not even being implemented in many countries—cannot 
be identified as the main obstacle to access to healthcare, because (a) few drugs are 
without generic substitutes; (b) the patent status of drugs does not tell anything about 
access to healthcare—generics are as inaccessible as patented drugs; (c) lowest prices 
have been achieved without patent modification. The main causes of the global health 
crisis are poverty and States’ political-economic failures, which make all items of 
healthcare—and not just medicines—inaccessible. Against this background, one 
participant reaffirms the necessity for compulsory licensing as a device to determine 
lowest prices (through generic competition). 
Argument 19 of the long version (high prices result in incomplete treatments) needs 
at least to be supplemented: people stop taking medicines when they start to feel 
better. Other missing arguments pertain to supplemental strategies (a global pri-
vate/public fund should be set up and combined with biodiversity credits, in the sense 
that biodiversity conservation is exchanged for resources from the fund) and to the 
adaptation of the patent system to claims of justice. Historically, patent protection has 
varied from country to country and, as a rule, has been connected with gains for the 
domestic industry and not with threats to public health. This is different for develop-
ing countries today. Therefore, one should think about modifications to the patent 
system (e.g., lower testing standards for drugs, lower prices, shorter duration of 
patents).  
1.2 In view of the fact that patenting and higher prices are essentially interrelated, 
what remains as the real focus of the controversy? What follows from this? 
Responses to this question can be grouped under the two headings of “justice” and 
“relevance”. On the one hand, inequality and injustice are seen as the focus of the 
controversy, either the inequitable distribution of resources as such, or the inequality 
built into the IPR system. Critics argue that IPRs are a system of rules appropriate for 
developed countries, which has been imposed on developing countries without 
differentiating monopoly rights of patents according to purchasing power—a differ-
entiation that would at least be accomplished partially by implementing pro-
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competitive measures like compulsory licensing (CL) or parallel imports (PI). On the 
other hand, the focus of the controversy is seen in an undue emphasis on patents and 
prices as compared to the failure of the public sector (infrastructure, funding). 
1.3 If industry lowers the drug prices to increase access to essential medicines 
governments may take this as an excuse for not fulfilling their own duties to 
contribute to the solution of the problems (and vice versa). How can this be 
prevented? 
Probably it would have been better had we framed this question directly: How can 
one exert pressure on States and companies? In any case, to set up a framework of 
incentives for governments is seen as “difficult”. Suggestions range from interna-
tional philanthropic coalitions, other governments, international organizations, or 
civil society exerting pressure on governments to not get in the way of appropriate 
measures and to invest in health systems and infrastructure. On this basis, industry 
could negotiate lower prices (e.g., bulk purchases), and urgencies could be dealt with 
on the basis of safeguards. In addition, a new international framework for differential 
pricing should be combined with regulations for retail prices. 
Leading Question 2: 
In view of the various safeguards and supplemental strategies that are available 
to lower drug prices and make medicines affordable are compulsory licensing 
and parallel imports the best instruments? 
2.1 Which arguments have to be added to gain a well-considered judgment on the 
controversial issues? 
The circular seems to have “reflected quite well the debates held in Montreux”, as 
one respondent put it. Thus, we find in the responses of participants more stress on 
aspects of given arguments then fundamentally new arguments. The indispensability 
of patents for R & D is highlighted again, and connected “logically” with the excep-
tional, but nonetheless effective, nature of CL. It is argued that some of those who 
advocate a liberal use of compulsory licenses combined with parallel imports have 
the industrial development of countries in mind that produce generics, rather than the 
access to medicines for the local poor, who cannot even pay for generics and have to 
struggle with unresolved distribution problems. Also, the problem of counterfeiting is 
mentioned. 
In addition, market segmentation is a crucial condition to make sure that CL, 
differential filing, and differential pricing are compatible with sustained investments 
in drug development. The condition has to be backed legally in the future. Doha has, 
however, shown that modifications to the interpretation the TRIPS Agreement to 
facilitate recourse to these mechanisms, can even now be accepted by the developed 
countries—which is taken as proof that previous more rigid interpretations reflect 
“serious errors and tensions”. Finally, investments in R & D have to be compared 
with promotion and marketing costs—a comparison that may also change the picture. 
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2.2 Safeguards and supplemental strategies can be combined. Are all combinations 
possible? E.g. differential pricing and parallel imports, or more flexible compulsory 
licensing and parallel imports? Which mix seems to be best? 
 
and 
 
2.4 Countries can be classified as developed, developing and least developed. What 
safeguard/supplemental strategy serves the interests of which type of country best? 
Responses to these questions can be combined. By and large, the following picture 
emerges: Where developed countries are mentioned at all, participants plead for 
strong patent protection—CL would destroy the industry, because a 5% royalty (for 
instance) would be too low—combined with a system of public healthcare and 
protected by market segmentation against, for instance, differentially priced products. 
Others reaffirm the validity of TRIPS as interpreted according to the Doha Declara-
tion, and argue for a free combination of CL, PI, exceptions (Bolar), differential 
pricing (DP), and longer transitional periods for developing countries. Some stress 
more than others the exceptional nature of the safeguards: only in cases of crises 
should they be applied by the poorest countries—a clause that may astonish those 
who witnessed the behavior of the U.S. and Canadian governments under the threat 
of anthrax. There is also dissent over the usefulness of classifying countries as least 
developed, developing, and developed, because development is unpredictable and, 
therefore, local industries’ needs for protection (against PI products, for instance) 
may have to be taken into account. 
Nevertheless, with respect to LDCs, a certain consensus emerges. For them, public 
funding, perhaps as biodiversity credits combined with DP (and possibly PI), seems 
to be indispensable, among other things, because product patents do not exist in many 
LCDs, manufacturing capacities are lacking, and CL may make industry reluctant to 
participate in DP. 
2.3 How can “differential (tiered) pricing” be turned into a sustainable strategy? 
Maybe this question was not elaborated enough to spur participants’ fantasies. 
Responses mention national measures to protect market segmentation, a case-by-case 
procedure in order to avoid anti-trust concerns, possible rules for fair negotiations 
between companies and countries, and a return to the situation before TRIPS (possi-
bly with the help of Lanjouw). One participant suggests a combination of items: 
namely, a radical change of mentality within industry, long-term commitments by the 
entirety of industry, a clear definition of initiatives deserving the label, “DP”, and a 
coordinating agency. 
Leading Question 3: 
Is strong patent protection a necessary condition for having a pharmaceutical 
industry with high investment in R & D? 
3.1 Which arguments have to be added to gain a well-considered judgment on the 
controversial issues? 
Against the argument that the established markets in developed countries have been 
large enough to generate higher than normal profits, it is held that (a) statements on 
profits are exaggerated, and (b) 95% of research is financed by private investment, 
which—if not protected—would be allocated elsewhere. The protection is needed in 
  – 45 –
view of the growing competition by generic companies and the increasing market 
presence of counterfeit drugs; moreover, protection cannot be compensated with 5% 
royalties (see above) or 1% research tax on generics. 
Chile is another counterexample to the assertion that patent protection will increase R 
& D and foreign investment. However, patent protection is just a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for R & D. There are other relevant factors (educational, eco-
nomic), and there is massive global over-capacity in manufacturing. In terms of 
economic efficiency, India and China are first choice for generic production. 
3.2 If there is no controversy about the need to protect investments, how do we get 
closer to a delimitation of legitimate margins? 
It is argued that the term “legitimate margin” does not make sense economically or 
cannot be delimited theoretically, because each case is specific. Instead, one may 
choose a pro-competitive approach, recovering investment and protecting public 
interest, as CL involving compensation does. One principle could be ability to pay 
(zero for LDCs), but where should the line be drawn? One soon ends up with little of 
the world paying for innovation. 
3.3 Under which conditions could strong product patent protection contribute to 
the development of new drugs for neglected diseases? 
Patents cannot contribute anything, because markets or technical-scientific infrastruc-
ture are missing. Maybe the creation of a market of whatsoever sort could help 
(purchase pre-commitments? See below: “Survey of Strategies) or stronger protection 
against substitutes in cases where the market is just large enough for one product. 
But, on the whole, only the international community and global funding can help. 
(B) ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: A SURVEY OF STRATEGIES 
1. Access to medicines 
It may be useful to summarize the measures touched upon in our dialogue or in the 
relevant literature. This holds all the more so, since one new proposal has been 
introduced just recently. Such a survey—if supplemented by some remarks with 
respect to advantages or disadvantages and basic interconnections—can help to come 
to final conclusions. In their responses to the 5th Circular, some participants already 
indicated how they would like to tune the IPR system. We have to thank them and 
know that we cannot expect them to repeat this effort. Nevertheless, maybe this 
“Summary of Strategies” and other participants’ initial responses will motivate them 
to refine their positions or add a remark on “purchase pre-commitments”. In any case, 
we urge all other participants—also those from other working groups—to ponder 
carefully over this part of our dialogue, because this is one of the central points at 
which the balance of the IPR system is at stake. 
Measures may lie completely beyond the legal-economic framework, within which 
pharmaceutical companies (or States) routinely operate: donations and contributions 
to national or international funds. These are commonly seen as welcome supple-
ments of the healthcare system—destined for the poorest populations. But, for 
reasons of sustainability, they cannot carry the main burden of healthcare. Other 
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strategies aim at the prices of medicines, either directly or indirectly, by stimulating 
generic competition. 
Generic production/competition is stimulated by using or granting flexibilities of the 
patent law, namely, first, by recourse to compulsory licensing (CL) and parallel 
imports (PI) as implied in the TRIPS Agreement. Bottlenecks or difficulties may be 
lacking production capacities—least developed countries will often have no suffi-
ciently developed pharmaceutical industries—and legal restrictions (e.g., production 
for the home market only). Voluntary licensing would be preferable to compulsory 
licensing, among other things, for reasons of a better chance for technology transfer. 
But companies, possibly struggling with overcapacities, may hesitate—CL may be 
needed as a threat. Flexibilities of the patent law, secondly, may be used in the form 
of voluntarily waivering patent rights for specific countries: differential filing, e.g., in 
the form of Lanjouw’s proposal or otherwise. 
Among States’ first measures to cut costs are, of course, price controls. But signifi-
cant price reductions have also been gained by negotiated price discounts and bulk 
purchases. Probably, the larger the bulk purchased, the higher the price reduction will 
be. Thus the idea of international purchasing funds emerges. But which target prices 
are to be aimed at, when cost/price information is not completely transparent? One 
possible solution could be a global system of differential pricing that would grant 
least developed countries (and what segments of developing countries?) essential 
medicines at cost prices. 
2. Research and Development 
Many of these strategies can be compatible with investment in R & D only under one 
central presupposition: market segmentation between rich and poor countries must be 
upheld—a presupposition that requires support by States, and this not only in the 
form of import-export controls. In order to be better able to fulfill their obligation of 
guaranteeing the human right to healthcare, States among the developed countries 
will be tempted to administer cost controls and, in so doing, use prices in the 
developing countries as reference prices. If this becomes common practice, the 
strategy of differential pricing breaks down. Thus, a political decision not to go into 
this sort of referential pricing is needed. This decision may be all the more acceptable 
to the respective populations, the less transparent the whole pricing system is. In this 
respect, sale-donation combinations and reimbursements of expenditures may be 
advisable; otherwise, the system is to be run by an international agency. In addition, 
access to international funds could be coupled to a criterion putting least developed 
countries under pressure, e.g., a minimum per capita public expenditure on health. 
Even if the best mix of strategies listed so far were realized, research on the neglected 
diseases would still fall through the sieve, because there are no markets for the 
respective drugs. One could set up research funds for neglected diseases, but these 
are notoriously inefficient. More efficient could be purchase pre-commitments that 
guarantee the purchase of a certain quantity of medicines with specified properties. 
Firms would then compete in developing this product. The winning product could be 
given at low price to developing countries. The following table summarizes: 
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Table: Survey of Strategies 
STRATEGY ADVANTAGES BOTTLENECKS 
Donations, funds • An extra • Sustainability? 
Compulsory licenses (plus 
Bolar exemption) 
• Generic competition 
and respective prices 
• Industrial capacities? 
• Technology transfer? 
• Market segmentation? 
Parallel imports • Lowest price on the 
market 
• Legal barriers? 
• Repercussions on 
exporter’s market? 
• Market segmentation? 
Voluntary licenses • Lower prices 
• Technology transfer 
• Sustainability 
(willingness of 
companies)? 
• Market segmentation? 
Differential filing • Prices of generic 
products 
• R & D for neglected 
diseases? 
Cost controls • Low prices • R & D? 
• Margin for price 
reduction on other 
markets? 
Negotiated bulk prices • Lower prices • Target price? 
• Differences according 
to size of countries? 
Global system of differen-
tial pricing, backed by 
international agreement 
• Cost prices for least 
developed countries 
• Compatible with R & D 
• Referential pricing and 
market segmentation? 
• Sustainability and 
transparency? 
• Developing countries? 
Purchase-donation 
combinations and 
reimbursements 
• Price reduction 
• Intransparency 
 
Research funds for 
neglected diseases 
• R & D • Markets? 
• Efficiency? 
Purchase pre-
commitments 
• R & D for neglected 
diseases 
• Market substitution 
• Lowest prices for least-
developed countries 
• Efficiency 
• ? 
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(C) POINTS FOR CONCLUSIONS  
Participants are invited to consider all the aspects mentioned and propose conclu-
sions. It may be useful first to come back to the leading questions of this section: 
1. The first leading question was: “Do patents preclude access to healthcare because 
they lead to high (unaffordable) prices for medicines in poor countries?”  
The transactions in the dialogue process suggest that in answering this question one 
has to take into account the weight of other factors determining healthcare (poverty, 
infrastructure), the role of competition and generic products, the availability of 
safeguards as confirmed by the Doha Declaration, and supplemental strategies like 
bulk purchases etc., and also the need to sustain R & D in drug development. So, 
which answer to this question (conclusion) gives an gives an adequate account of 
these factors? 
2. The second leading question was: “In view of the various safeguards and supple-
mental strategies that are available to lower drug prices and make medicines 
affordable are compulsory licensing and parallel imports the best instruments?”  
Since Doha has definitely reaffirmed the safeguards in the TRIPS Agreement (CL, 
PI, exceptions, and delays) the questions might be reframed as follows: In view of the 
survey of strategies (in the table above), what should be added to the Doha Declara-
tion in order to improve access to medicines for the poor? 
3. The third leading question was: “Is strong patent protection a necessary condition 
for having a pharmaceutical industry with high investment in R & D?”  
This question can also be reframed a little bit. Participants are invited to take the 
possibilities of safeguards, generic competition, price controls, etc. into account and 
conclude: Can the balance between access to medicines and protection of investment 
in patent law now be considered acceptable; or what improvements or modifications 
are still indispensable?  
Further conclusions should be proposed regarding the following questions: 
4. Where do we see common ground? 
5. What issues/points are still highly controversial? 
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The next circular contains a summary of participants’ answers to the questions on 
normative arguments. It runs as follows.  
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IPR Dialogue Process 
Steps Towards Conclusions 
Part II.2: Summary of Participants’ Responses to Circular 8, 
Access to Essential Medicines—The Normative Arguments 
The normative issues and arguments of access to healthcare were dealt with in the 8th 
Circular. Nine participants responded to this Circular. Their responses are docu-
mented in the members corner of the IPR website, and they will be summarized 
below. There will be no new questions! Up to now, industry has been a bit more 
industrious than other participants. It would be very helpful, however, if we could 
base the final round in London on a more balanced distribution of responses. This is 
why we once again urge participants to send us some additional reactions to Circular 
8 and to “Steps towards Conclusions, Part II.1” (especially answers to the questions 
at the end). 
1. What arguments are missing or inadequately stressed? 
Most missing arguments pertain to patents on essential medicines and the human 
right to healthcare. On a meta-level, some emphasize that the relevance of the 
controversy might easily be misperceived, if one failed to recognize the context: 
Access to medicines is deficient in many countries, irrespective of the patent status of 
medicines (i.e., also for generics), because of the “enormous inequity between 
nations”, and false priorities and political strategies of countries that have resulted in 
totally deficient healthcare systems. 
Taking this for granted, possible conflicts between IPRs and the human right to 
healthcare are addressed differentially. On the one hand, it is stressed that a correct 
interpretation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights precludes placing IPRs 
and a right of access to healthcare “in opposition to each other”. This is because 
(a) property (Art. 17), including intellectual property (Art. 27) is protected by the 
Declaration; (b) the right to essential medicines has to be read as a right to a standard 
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of living adequate (to buy medicines); and (c) undermining of others’ rights is 
forbidden. In addition, the social human rights cannot claim precedence over other 
norms, but have to be compatible, among other things, with international agreements 
(paper sent to the WZB). 
This general thrust of argumentation could also be backed by arguments pertaining to 
the moral inadequacy of exploiting inventors, to the necessity of stimulating and 
protecting R & D, and to the comparatively small contribution of public sector 
research to the development of medicines. Furthermore, if “need” (for healthcare) 
were a sufficient reason to deny patents on medicines, “any socially applicable 
technology must be in the public domain”. But all societies had also used instruments 
of exclusions—these are not new constructions. On the whole, the patent system is 
not the instrument to ensure equal access to medicines for all. “It can only ensure 
equal access [to patents] to all inventors.” 
On the other hand, it is argued that IPRs in themselves represent a “delicate balance” 
between inventors’ property rights and rights of society as a whole (here qua pur-
chasers of medicines). Certainly, the balance cannot be struck in such a way that “10-
25% of the population” cannot be kept alive. Instead, the balance should be struck by 
each country, according to the level of development. This differentiation does not 
imply that the poorest countries need no IP. But especially with respect to patents on 
medicines, companies have to show responsibility: “Right to life is first.” Further-
more, the way IP has been created may generate obligations (drawing resources from 
society using traditional knowledge, tax breaks and withholding of legitimate dues by 
big players). These obligations can be met only by instituting adequate safeguards, 
offering reasonable prices (in a system of DP) and possibly contributions to interna-
tional funds. But, one may object, differential pricing is difficult to implement (free 
riders) and safeguards are not used to improve access to medicines, but rather to 
“boost local industrial development”. 
Under the topic, “injustice of the IPR system”, one main point was added: there is no 
equality of access to IP protection for the big, rich players, and the small inventors. 
For the latter, a whole new system of low-cost IP protection (including databases, 
registration, penalties for wrongful disclosure, etc.), possibly funded by a “new tax on 
super-selling drugs”, should be set up. On the other hand, there were also some 
arguments refuting/modifying assertions about the injustice of the system: Doha has 
shown that developing countries do have a say; the system is not simply Western 
neo-colonialism, because it has been successfully used in developing countries; there 
is no one-size-fits-all approach, because of safeguards and still valid delays for 
implementation, and, in any case, it is highly questionable whether the development 
of an indigenous pharmaceutical industry is the right way to achieve industrialization 
for many countries (consider, e.g., overcapacity, competition with India, China). 
2. How far can the moral duties of companies reach in view of the fact that 
companies have to be profit oriented? 
Companies’ right to make profit is undisputed and held to be compatible with moral 
duties and responsibilities. But this can mean more or less. One sees main responsi-
bilities in long-term perspectives for employees, shareholders, and in the develop-
ment of new medicines combined with punctual actions like drug donations for the 
poor populations. To this are added differential pricing, more commitment in 
combating grave diseases, redirecting parts of astronomical salaries into healthcare 
for the poorest, refraining from lobbying for TRIPS-Plus legislation, and treating 
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developing countries on an equal footing (no forbidden pesticides, dialogue on small 
patents). 
3. What division of labor should obtain between States and companies with 
respect to the moral duty to improve access to healthcare? 
With one exception—States have to provide tax incentives and companies have to 
contribute to healthcare infrastructure—participants stress States’ responsibilities 
first. States should set new budgetary priorities, build up an infrastructure, create a 
framework for international action, give tax incentives for participation in differential 
pricing, and provide funds for the poorest segments of the population. Pharmaceutical 
companies’ role is restricted (only 10 to 20% of total healthcare costs are drug costs) 
but important: participate in differential pricing, refrain from undue interference 
(TRIPS-Plus), and support R & D. 
4. Is there a need to confine proposed solutions to essential medicines and how 
are these to be defined? 
The definition of “essential medicines” is too vague. Irrespective of this, responses of 
participants can be somehow classified as ranging from more narrow to broader 
approaches. There is the position that CL should remain “exceptional” and be 
restricted to public purchases of medicines, that parallel trade has to be confined, and 
that there can be no systematic differential pricing beyond what companies practice 
anyway (very low prices for States)—mainly for reasons of antitrust law. Others 
think that essential medicines would be a good “place to start”, or plead, only for 
pragmatic reasons, for a “narrower” first stage (the major diseases, HIV, malaria, TB, 
etc.). And there are some who vote for more far-reaching solutions, among other 
things, because most essential medicines are off-patent and there is also a lack of 
access in developed countries. The battle will not be to confine solutions, but to 
expand the self-perceived limits of companies. 
5. Are (inclusive) human rights and (exclusive) property rights to be treated on 
the same level? 
On the one hand, there is the position that these concepts cannot be placed in opposi-
tion, or that the question is based on “naïve confusion”. Others differentiate between 
the property rights domain and the political/moral domain; they grant that property 
rights are not absolute rights, but also see that the human rights concept is becoming 
overburdened. Finally, human rights are held to prevail over private property rights, 
especially in life-and-death conflicts. This holds especially for IPRs, which are a 
“public policy instrument”, not full-fledged ownership. 
6. Would there still be normative criticisms of the IPR system if safeguards plus 
differential pricing were implemented? 
Except for professional critics, generics manufacturers, and irresponsible govern-
ments hiding behind the IPR scapegoat, criticism would lessen because the system, as 
interpreted by Doha, now allows (L)DCs “to tailor their IP regime to their develop-
ment needs”. The situation would be even better if public health infrastructures could 
be strengthened at the same time. On the other hand, CL and PI have to be held 
compatible with R & D. 
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7. If TRIPS implies an “undue extension of Western concepts” and a neglect of 
the “cultural dimension”, which aspects would have to be changed and how? 
Some see no “undue extension of Western concepts” and no need for change. Others 
concede that Western concepts are used, but inevitably in a global economy. A need 
for change is seen in “a more balanced form of representation”, “staged implementa-
tion according to development need”, “protection of TK and small inventors”, and 
“interface with the CBD”. Possibly an agreement against counterfeiting, and just that, 
would be better than TRIPS. 
8. The assignment of property rights is, by definition, connected with inequali-
ties and exclusion. What are the reasons for classifying these implications as 
injustice? 
There are no credible reasons, because IPRs reward risk taking and R & D, and it 
would be unjust not to do so. Others see an injustice in the ever-growing gap between 
rich and poor, and in lack of access to property. With respect to IPRs, there can be 
unjust manners of exercising them (monopoly prices, overcharging) and, because it is 
selective, an unjust way of granting them (small inventors, TK). 
9. Is the “right to development” compatible/incompatible with IPRs? 
IPRs serve “best the right to development”, because they further investment, stop 
brain drain, and open up access to developed country markets. The fact that devel-
oped countries themselves did not have to respect IPRs in former times, does not 
prove anything, because, at that time, international trade was irrelevant, contrary to 
today’s world. To this position, it is objected that development does not follow from 
IPRs, but IPRs from development. Nevertheless, IPRs can be compatible with 
development, if the property system were more equitable, and IPRs would be adapted 
to development needs. On a meta-level, one may ask “what the right to development 
really means”. 
10. What mechanism should be used to improve access to the whole IPR system 
(in terms of costs, for instance, of filing, revoking) for the poor (countries)? 
Lower the costs! This is to be done through a no-cost network of IPR lawyers, an IPR 
foundation for indigenous groups, incentives for inventors to apply for protection, 
regional acceptance of patents, piggy-backing on richer countries, and civil action 
against infringers. 
11. What other questions should be posed? 
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4.4 Rapporteur’s Report to the Final Conference 
Steps Toward Conclusions, Part II.1 once again put questions to participants with 
the specific aim of attaining summary conclusions. Only six replies were received. 
Given this meagre response, they were not evaluated. The resulting picture would 
have been too aleatory or one-sided. This highly unsatisfactory response rate had 
to do with timing problems. Since the reactions of participants tended to trickle in 
at a slow pace, there were delays and greater pressure shortly before the start of the 
final conference in London. Not all the “homework” could be finished and the 
argument surveys were not condensed. However, this omission was fully 
compensated by the contribution of the rapporteur at the final conference, a 
stroke of luck in every regard. The rapporteur in question, representing an African 
NGO, presented a balanced “report” — at any rate balanced enough to elicit the 
following spontaneous statement from a representative of industry: “I was able to 
go along with it to a great extent.” The presentation on “access to health care” — 
announced as being from “an NGO perspective” — was oriented on questions 
put in the circulars, and ran as follows (continuous numbering added). 
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Access to healthcare—an NGO perspective 
Dr Christopher Ouma, ActionAid 
Patents and access—-what is the real focus of the 
controversy? 
1. The actualisation of basic rights for the poor, their ability to 
recognise and claim their rights, and the states right to pursue 
policies to that effect.  
2. No agreement should prevent a state from preserving the ba-
sic rights of her citizens 
Do patents on essential medicines violate the right to access 
healthcare? 
3. Human rights and property rights are part of the same spec-
trum—we have to draw a line that will have the best out-
come. 
4. A right to remuneration rather than a right to exclusion. 
5. Access should be based on need rather than on the ability to 
pay.  
6. Patents have represented a significant hurdle in the drive to-
wards access for the poor.  
Are CL and PI the best instruments to increase access? 
7. Solutions for access are varied, in the same way that incomes 
are different. Every state must have the right to use the op-
tions that it feels serve the interests of its people best. 
8. CL and PI represent some of the most effective options so 
far. Some sanity has returned in terms of pricing of AIDS 
drugs. 
Is strong patent protection necessary for investment in 
R & D? 
9. It is an important incentive [in developed countries].  
10. Sometimes forgotten are political will (despots, tyrants, 
dictators and villains), human rights and security. 
11. To exert pressure on States—we use participatory planning 
and reviews, and budget tracking. 
How can strong patent protection contribute to neglected 
diseases? 
12. Can stimulate research if there is increased patent period, 
purchase precommitments and tax exemptions. 
13. Will need input through political stability, increased political 
will and state investment. 
  – 56 –
Other options 
14. Tier pricing, 
Bulk purchasing, 
Purchase precommitments, 
Voluntary licensing, 
Negotiated price discounts, 
Increasing per capita expenditure on health e.g. African 
countries commitment to spend 15$ per person per year. 
In conclusion 
15. The current IPR regime has led to deinvestment and limited 
technology transfer, and no commitments in the agreement 
have been forthcoming.  
16. In the new round of trade talks we hope to see support for re-
source poor nations (Financial and personnel), greater in-
volvement of CSOs and greater involvement of stakeholders. 
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Many of the statements are easy to assign to a NGO perspective. “No agreement 
should prevent a state from preserving the basic rights of its citizens” (2); Patents 
should not grant a monopoly: “a right to remuneration rather than a right to 
exclusion” (4); “access should be based on need rather than on ability to pay” (5); 
“CL and PI represent some of the most effective options so far” (8); and “every 
state must have the right to use the options that it feels serve the interests of its 
people best” (7) are fully pertinent in this regard and, taken together, describe a 
quite unambiguous position — or so it appears. However, the exact meaning of 
these statements must be seen in the context of other statements, which provide a 
balanced picture. “Human rights and property rights are part of the same spectrum 
— we have to draw a line that will have the best outcome” (3) contrasts markedly 
with the usual counterargumentative slogans demanding clear prioritizing of the 
“human right to essential medicines.” In this case a reconciliation of interests on a 
continuum is sought. The IPR system is not called into question in principle. In 
developed countries, patents are “an important incentive” (9), and patent 
protection should even be strengthened in the case of neglected diseases (increased 
patent period (12)). “More flexibility for poor countries” is thus the core message 
of the presentation, an issue on which the opposing side is open to negotiation. It 
is also striking that the role of the failure of governmental agencies is more 
strongly underlined than usual in NGO publications. Not that this point is entirely 
neglected. But it is hardly every given more than cursory treatment. In the 
presentation under discussion it is addressed four times (10, 11, 13, 14 last point) 
— and using very strong language like “despots, tyrants, dictators and vil-
lains” (16). Thus the buck is not simply passed to industry, a manoeuvre that 
otherwise always produces a degree of indignation in business circles. 
In all, it is therefore understandable that representatives of industry found this 
presentation of an NGO perspective moderate. An attempt, initially in separate 
talks, was accordingly made to develop the declaration into a common platform. It 
failed. Nevertheless, the presentation gave major impetus to the search for com-
mon ground, and the author was requested to structure further discussions by 
presenting a concrete case history from his practical experience. The case history 
made the relevance of the conflict on the patenting of medicines drastically clear. 
An NGO had taken on the task of supplying a district in an African country with 
AIDS medicines, and entered into negotiations with drugs companies. The pat-
ented brand preparation cost about $10,000 per year, a corresponding generic 
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product would cost only about $260 a year. For Africa this difference is naturally 
the difference between hopelessness and hope. 
The presentation of the case did not determine the further progress of the dis-
course, but did supply the emotional backdrop. In order to achieve results under 
increasing time pressure, the moderator especially engaged for the final conference 
suggested carrying out a brainstorming session with subsequent selection. Mem-
bers of the working group identified statements which, in their view, ought to be 
included in the common conclusions of the process. Statements were checked to 
see if they met with opposition and were then presented to the plenum at the final 
session. The documents and plenary discussions were to provide the basis for the 
final report to be prepared by the Steering Committee with the assistance of the 
WZB team. 
4.5 Note from the WZB Team for the Final Report: Attractors of 
Argumentation 
The draft for final report was drawn up on a broader basis than the discussions in 
London. This was because the group of people who took part in the sessions of 
the working group on access to essential medicines in London overlapped only 
partly with the group that had expressed their views in the Internet discourse. And 
the results of the London conference were as a whole “thinner” and less substan-
tial than what had emerged in the course of E-mail correspondence as possibly 
capable of finding a consensus. “Possibly capable of finding a consensus” because a 
weaker consensus criterion was chosen than “full agreement.” Since some organi-
zations in effect prevented their representatives from showing enough argumenta-
tive flexibility — a sort of imperative mandate — full agreement would almost 
inevitably have implied reduction to a substantive zero. To avoid this it was pro-
posed to include statements from the Internet exchanges in the final report that 
could find the support of representatives of both conflict parties. Such statements 
can be regarded as attractors of argumentation, which incorporate a real balance of 
interests. Dissenting participants — keyword “minorities” — were to have the 
option of declaring themselves “observers.” This procedure was explained to the 
Steering Committee and participants in the first draft of the final report as follows. 
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      (Tentative) Attractors of Argumentation in the
Discussions on AEM   
 
Rainer Döbert 
Remarks for the SC 
In the following you will find six pages on AEM. They do not reproduce the entire 
complexity of argumentation on that topic—why reproduce the argumentation tree in 
toto? Instead, they concentrate in a specific way on a sort of common ground, which 
is a little bit less than unanimity. For this purpose, I add to the statements agreed 
upon in London further statements that emerged from the electronic dialogue (and 
sometimes directly from the argumentation trees) as widely—not completely—
acceptable. Some of these additional statements help to clarify and delimit the 
meaning of those statements accepted in London; others supplement the range of 
considerations. Maybe at one point or another, one would like to add some further, 
semi-consensual statements; maybe at one point or another, one would like to take 
one more glance at divergences. We shall see! 
In any case, it would be extremely helpful to find out at that point in the process, 
whether the Steering Committee, wants to set up this type of final report for the topic 
of AEM. If you have the impression that it is the right type of report, then please 
respond with details in the form of constructive criticism. For those worried about 
being put away with the wrong party to a non-existent common ground let me stress: 
Everyone can remain observer! And let me add that the whole thing was put together 
with an eye on one goal, namely, to demarcate what industry can contribute. If one 
wants to make industry move in the right direction, one may be well advised to ease 
tension and anger. That is why emphasis has been laid on the fact that not principles 
as such or the very existence of a research-based pharmaceuticals industry are at 
stake, but the point of a compromise. Hopefully, stress has been adequately placed 
without generating unwanted imbalances! 
Rainer Döbert 
A. How Much Consensus Is Required for Coming Up with a Significant 
Result? 
In a conflict like that about an adequate relationship between AEM and IPRs, one 
finds, as a rule, a distribution of opinions in the beginning of a dialogue process and 
also at its end. If the dialogue process has done what it was supposed to do, namely, 
to generate some argumentative reasons to change position, then the distribution of 
opinions may have become narrower, and more „points“ in the distribution are 
supported by representatives of the most divergent views—for instance, both by 
industry and NGOs. Let us call these points „attractors of argumentation“, points that 
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attract many, but do not succeed in attracting all participants. This is less than perfect 
consensus or unanimity. 
An additional restriction will be useful with respect to the meaning of „support“ 
of an argument by participants. Full, explicit support of an argument („I agree …“, 
„In my view …“) would of course be the best indicator of support. But there may be 
more indirect forms of agreement like „not opposing a statement by someone else“ or 
logical implication of one statement by another (even if silence cannot in general be 
taken as approval). To give an example, if one agrees that a margin for R & D has to 
be guaranteed in prices of pharmaceuticals, then it becomes difficult to stick to the 
position that the use of compulsory licenses can be left completely unconditional, 
because such an unrestricted use would drive prices to marginal costs with no 
protection of R & D investment. 
What would one gain by scrutinizing the transactions of the WBCSD dialogue 
project with these qualifications in mind? First, since representatives of the most 
divergent views join in backing/not opposing the statements identified, one may 
conclude that the ensemble of respective statements circumscribes something like a 
workable compromise of conflicting claims. Second, this can be stated in an ob-
server’s perspective without having to enter the resulting field of convergences. Since 
neither unanimity nor enthusiastic support (non-opposition suffices) is required, 
whoever refers to the result can signal as much distance to it as he or she wants. What 
is said is simply that we can observe an attractor, a region of convergence in the 
dialogue process with the specifications as indicated. Third, by proceeding in this 
manner, one gains something of the advantages of „voting“ without having to 
„swallow“ its disadvantages. The advantage consists of „numbers“ as one indicator of 
acceptability, however weak or strong. The disadvantage being avoided consists of 
splitting participants into a rigid disjunction of pro and contra. One concentrates on 
middle ground. Fourth, because the requirements for this sort of limited consensus 
are weaker than those for outspoken, unanimous support, we may find more sub-
stance and thus be able to come up with more than truisms like „health is a precious 
good“. By having more content, it may be possible to demonstrate a peculiarity of the 
conflict over IPRs and AEM: Contrary to initial impressions, this conflict is not about 
basically diverging values in the sense that fundamental values, norms or goals of 
opponents are rejected or disqualified as irrelevant; instead, the controversy is one 
about tuning a system in such a way that the legitimate claims of all involved are 
respected as much as possible. It is not „principles“ that are at stake, but rather 
adequate compromise. 
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5. The Final Report: Conclusions on Access to Essential Medicines 
The proposal to proceed in the way outlined in the “attractors of argumentation” 
was accepted, and the final report was drawn up on this basis with the statements 
approved in London being indicated by footnotes. Suggestions from participants 
for improvements were worked in, dissenting opinions and the corresponding 
formulations were taken into account in footnotes. The final report ran as follows. 
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Access to Essential Medicines 
Introduction 
Lack of access to essential medicines is an element in the health crisis that threatens 
many countries in the poorer parts of the world. Access to medicines is affected by 
many factors, IPRs (especially patents) being one of those factors. In this respect, a 
broad consensus exists among representatives of the most different organizations. 
Controversial issues are the extent to which patents affect access to medicines and 
whether such impact warrants (or requires) the revision of current regimes of intellec-
tual property, especially of the TRIPS Agreement. 
The assessment of the relevance of patents has a factual dimension and a normative 
one. In the factual dimension the crucial question is whether patents, because they 
lead to higher prices, will make essential medicines unaffordable for poor people. It 
was understood that any discussion of this question must also touch upon the safe-
guards — such as compulsory license or parallel imports — built into IPR regimes to 
mitigate possible negative impacts of patents on access to medicines. The participants 
discussed how these safeguards could be used (and redesigned) under the TRIPS 
Agreement. In principle, conceptions could range from denying patents for medicines 
altogether to making even stronger provisions for IPR protection (TRIPS-plus). Some 
participants also referred to supplemental strategies that might function as equiva-
lents to those safeguards: differential pricing, donations, etc. Some of these strategies 
(international funds, new health policies) require interventions from the public sector 
(governments or WHO). 
In the normative dimension the discussions focused on three main questions: (1) Do 
patents on essential medicines violate the human right of access to health-care? 
(2) Do companies have moral obligations to contribute to the solution of the health 
crisis in developing countries? (3) Is the IPR system (TRIPS) flawed because 
injustice and unfairness are built into it? 
Controversy over both the factual and the normative issues prevailed in the Dialogue 
Process. The participants had divergent views and preferences with regard to the 
options implied in various safeguards and supplemental strategies. This divergence 
reflects (among other factors) different notions of how conflicting objectives of IPR 
regimes should be balanced: Prices should be low enough to make medicines 
affordable for the poor, and they should be high enough to provide incentives for 
investment in R & D to create these medicines in the first place. There seemed to be 
broad consensus among participants that both objectives must somehow be taken into 
account in designing and assessing the regime of IPRs — but how exactly? In this 
respect many divergences remained. 
Controversy over normative issues can hardly come as a surprise. Value conflicts are 
notoriously difficult to settle. Nevertheless, in this dimension, too, one could observe 
some argumentative flexibility: Participants managed to come up with conclusions 
which represent at least more consensus than existed at the beginning of the dialogue. 
The conclusions listed below for the Working Group on Access to Essential Medi-
cines hardly represent perfect consensus. The London conference succeeded in 
passing a series of statements that came very close to unanimity (footnoted as 
“London”). However, often the best result achieved consisted in statements that 
attracted many, but not all, participants. Such statements, especially because they are 
supported by representatives from both the industry and the NGOs, indicate “attrac-
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tors of argumentation”. They should be included in the conclusions to give a more 
complete picture of the whole field of argumentation.35 
A. The Need to Integrate Conflicting Objectives and Values 
The following three statements taken together suggest that a workable compromise is 
at stake in the whole debate. The statements acknowledge in principle the goals and 
values of the conflicting parties, establish the primacy of public health in the case of 
conflict, and restrict the possible interpretation of “primacy” in such a way that 
industry does not have to pay the whole bill. Not all participants, but many with 
otherwise opposing views, supported the balance represented by the following three 
statements in combination. The “in combination” has to be emphasized especially in 
this section because each of the three statements taken in isolation would be mislead-
ing as a representation of the discussion. 
115. Any sustainable solution to the conflict between IPRs and access to medi-
cines should combine respect for human rights, the acknowledgement of 
property rights, and it should be compatible with R & D.36 
116. If there is a conflict, public health has primacy over IPRs.37 
117. Companies are economic agents and as such have a right to be profit ori-
ented, but have a responsibility to act ethically and respect human rights. A 
right to compensation for innovation must be acknowledged. In particular, 
the human right to health does not apply to private products (medicines), 
but to the information required for manufacturing medicines as implied in 
the States´ right to grant compulsory licenses”.38 
B. The Role of Patents, Prices, and R & D 
The participants joined in the assessment that high prices for IPR-protected medicines 
can be one barrier for access to healthcare in poor countries — but among other 
factors. They acknowledged that special conditions should obtain for those in need, 
and that the safeguards of the TRIPS Agreement and supplemental strategies like 
differential pricing must be considered in this respect. The participants did not agree 
on the interpretation of the “exceptional nature” of compulsory licensing and on the 
adequacy and reach of parallel imports; but there was a rather broad consensus that 
these instrument should be used under the conditions/restrictions spelled out by 
international treaties. 
                                                 
35 One participant found section A, “The Need to Integrate Conflicting Objectives and Values”, unbalanced and 
preferred to remain “observer”, saying neither “yes” nor “no”. 
36 One participant (expert) preferred the following wording of paragraph 115: “Any sustainable solution … should 
combine respect for human rights with a recognition that there is a need to provide public support and private 
incentives to fund R&D of new medicines” 
37 Statement 116 was opposed by some participants, because “one human right cannot prevail over the other”. One 
participant (industry) emphasized that the statement does not imply “that any public health issue is enough to 
override IPRs …, [rather:] if serious problems arise and no sustainable solutions have been found through public 
spending, donations, etc., then, of course, public health has primacy over IPRs and waivers could be implemented to 
safeguard that poor people still have access to essential medicines. But this should be the ultimate solution.” 
Statement 115 was opposed by another participant if not combined with statement 116. One may say that 115 was 
adopted in London with one qualification; there was no unanimity, but the combination of 115 and 116 was accept-
able to many representatives of opposing views. 
38 One participant (expert) disagreed with the last sentence “In particular, the human right …” since this statement is 
misleading in view of the fact that States do have the right to expropriate private products as necessary. 
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118. Patents can represent a barrier, but they are not the only barrier to (health-
care) access in poor countries.39 
119. The main causes of the global health crises are widespread poverty, inade-
quate political priorities and the inability/failure of States and of the inter-
national community to provide public funding, especially for those seg-
ments of the populations that cannot even afford to buy generics. 
120. The outcome of the Doha Declaration is endorsed “as it stands”.40 
121. A combination of safeguards, essentially in the form of compulsory licens-
ing, with a system of differential pricing41 would be a significant improve-
ment in the status quo. In a differential pricing system, least developed 
countries would have access to essential medicines at cost prices or below 
(drug donations).42  
122. Differential pricing schemes presuppose the establishment of market seg-
mentation, preventing re-imports to developed countries. They also presup-
pose a renunciation of referential pricing by governments of developed 
countries. Otherwise they would be incompatible with R & D.43 
123. The costs of R & D are covered to such an extent by the markets of devel-
oped countries that least developed countries can be relieved from contrib-
uting to the profits and costs of R & D. This is a variant of the moral prin-
ciple of distribution according to need, as adapted to the business system. 
Otherwise a principle of contribution (to R & D) according to ability to pay 
should prevail.44 
124. Governments should initiate multi-stakeholder processes to address a 
(health) crisis. Patent owners should “exercise their rights in a manner sup-
portive of access to healthcare by all, and patent owners and other suppliers 
should respond promptly and in good faith, in procedures for the granting 
of compulsory licenses in consistency with TRIPS”.45 
125. R & D for neglected diseases should be increased, including public re-
search and the use of public-private partnerships.46 
                                                 
39 Agreed upon at the London conference. 
40 Agreed upon at the London conference. 
41 A system of differential pricing, if based on collusion or other anti-competitive practices may be incompatible with 
some national anti-trust laws. 
42 One participant (expert) preferred the formulation “or below” to be deleted since drug donations are unrelated to 
pricing issues. Another participant disagreed with the whole paragraph, because “there is no consensus that compul-
sory licenses are linked with the use of differential pricing.” In addition, the same participant stated that differential 
pricing schemes will not improve access to essential medicines, because other factors are much more relevant in this 
regard.” Another participant (industry) pointed out that a scheme of differential pricing should not prevent the search 
for individual, possibly better, solutions. 
43 One participant preferred the following formulation: “Parallel imports and differential pricing may require stronger 
controls in developed countries to avoid diversion of products from low-priced developing countries´ markets and a 
renunciation of referential pricing by developed countries´ governments.  
44 Some preferred the following formulation: “If the costs of R & D are covered by the markets of developed countries, 
then public health care systems in least developed countries (LDCs) can be relieved from contributing to the profits 
and costs of R & D”, because “in developing countries (DCs) [not least developed] there is a private market that can 
bear R & D costs”.  
45 Agreed upon at the London conference. 
46 Agreed upon at the London conference. 
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C. Human Rights and Justice 
(1) Human Rights and IPRs 
There was a broad consensus that companies have a moral duty to help those in need, 
and to promote better access to medicines for the poor. Participants did not agree, 
however, that such a duty could be framed in terms of human rights. As a legal 
document, the Declaration of Human Rights obliges States, not private companies. 
There was consensus that the right to healthcare obliges governments, for example, to 
set policy priorities that support access to medicines, including appropriate funding of 
healthcare systems, or to use the safeguards and flexibilities of patent law accord-
ingly. These obligations do not necessarily imply a mandate to disregard the protec-
tion of private property, since the latter is a human right as well47. Companies, in 
turn, have a duty not to undermine legitimate government policies for better access to 
medicines.  
126. Public healthcare is primarily the responsibility of the government.48 
127. Governments have the right to define “emergency” and a duty to act upon 
it, e.g., by allocating appropriate funding, giving primacy to public health, 
setting the right priorities.49 
128. In view of the Declaration of Human Rights and in view of the very nature 
of IPRs, both as public policy and legal instruments, States have the duty to 
couch intellectual property law in such a way that the common good, espe-
cially public health, is respected. TRIPS, as interpreted by the Doha Decla-
ration, can be read as an application of this duty. 
129. Within the limits of reasonable economic calculation, companies have to 
show responsibility; that is, they must try to help further the common good 
through donations or contributions to funds and differential pricing prac-
tices. 
130. As States have to integrate respect for the common good into their IPR 
legislation, companies have to accept the safeguards of TRIPS and abstain 
from any lobbying for TRIPS-plus legislation, which undermines the use of 
the safeguards. 
(2) Debate over the Justice of TRIPS 
The justice of the TRIPS agreement, both in the sense of the fairness of the procedure 
of negotiation and the equity of the contents of the treaty, are a matter of ongoing 
debate. This debate is, in the final instance, propelled by concerns that the enforce-
ment of IPRs could contribute to widening the gap between North and South. The 
participants could not discuss the issue at great length. However, at some points there 
was convergence that may serve as the basis for further discussion. 
                                                 
47 One participant (expert) requested that the half-sentence “since the latter is a human right” be deleted, since “the 
idea that corporations hold property as part of their ‘human rights’ is awkward and legally flawed”. On the other 
hand, one participant (industry) argued that the notion that rights to knowledge are protected as human rights is also 
implied in the demand that rights regarding traditional knowledge should be protected as rights held by the respec-
tive community. 
48 Agreed upon at the London conference. 
49 Agreed upon at the London conference. 
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131. Even if the procedure of arriving at TRIPS was not as “flawed” as some 
assert, it was flawed enough to justify that the TRIPS agreement will either 
be amended or interpreted by the TRIPS Council in line with the Doha 
Declaration.50 
132. The imposition of a global order of IPRs favors developed countries. To 
undo resulting imbalances and lacking reciprocities, compensation in the 
trade sector for textiles and agricultural products, as well technology trans-
fer has been promised. Up to now many of these promises have not been 
kept.51 
133. The whole IPR system discriminates against poor countries52 and small 
inventors because it is too costly. 
 
                                                 
50 Representatives of industry emphasized that this point should be deleted, because “the dialogue was not made to 
discuss this issue”. 
51 Some representatives of industry said that this point should be deleted for the following reason: “It is the other way 
round … GATT … if implemented correctly … would result in advantages for both developed and developing 
countries. Only because the USA and the EU have not yet done this in the agricultural and textile sector, developing 
countries are still behind.” 
52 Some representatives of industry said that the phrase “against poor countries” ought to be deleted. 
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6. Tentative Evaluation of Process and Outcome: Rationality, 
Consensus, Governance 
Finally, a number of explanatory remarks on the status of the above final report 
are needed. This report is, by and large, meant to give an account of the visible 
course of the stakeholder dialogue on access to essential medicines and IPRs. 
Orientations and assumptions of the organizing agencies (WZB and WBCSD) and 
participants were touched upon just to such an extent that the whole process can 
be understood step by step. A detailed analysis of the implications for sociological 
theory has been postponed for the time being. This will be dealt with in subse-
quent publications. Quite a bit of microanalysis will be required, for instance, to 
clarify how the discourse process transforms given inputs (single arguments) by 
putting them into the context of competing arguments. But, after all, an outcome 
— the final report — is present now, and some of its implications for the theoreti-
cal considerations spelled out at the beginning of this paper (governance, consen-
sus, rationality) can be read from the result without going into details of its genesis. 
How comprehensive was the participation on which it was based? To what extent 
can it be considered a rational judgment in reflective equilibrium? How broad is 
the consensus it incorporates? Broad enough to generate governance? 
To begin with the positive aspects, it should be noted that the Steering Committee, 
backing the conclusions, included representatives of all conflict parties. Although 
dissenting opinions were registered in the footnotes, we do not consider them 
weighty enough to refute the assessment that the discourse process produced a 
relevant and agreed result. This would have been impossible without the argumen-
tative flexibility of participants. The process has been overtaken by the Doha 
Declaration, but at the time when the latter was published the dialogue was in the 
throes of deriving something along Doha lines from the arguments it had mobi-
lized. And the argumentative basis for the Doha Declaration is to be found not in 
the Declaration itself but in the argumentation surveys of the discourse process 
under discussion. Furthermore, the debates stressed (extralegal) supplemental 
strategies like differential pricing — now becoming official EU policy — in order 
to lighten the burden of poor countries. In effect, the report aimed to improve a 
multifunctional balance, thus blocking the way for monofunctionally inspired bias. 
And in its diagnosis of the causes of the global crisis in the health care system it 
cleared a logjam by emphasizing the role of governmental failure. These are 
rationality gains in the sense of this process presentation that show convincingly 
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why the content of the final report was indeed able to find limited consensus. Up 
to a certain point, argumentation works a a genuine medium of communication 
informing and motivating agents. 
However, a number of undoubted shortcomings are to be noted. First, representa-
tives of three NGOs withdrew to observer status, despite the possibility to include 
dissenting formulations in the final report. A majority of NGOs, it appears, believe 
themselves unable to run the risk of deviating from the official stance of their 
organizations, and say neither “yes” nor “no.” This is not dissent, but it is a great 
deal less than consent. 
There were also deficiencies in participation, largely as far as NGOs were con-
cerned. Important NGO representatives were absent from the final conference. 
Their participation in the E-mail dialogue was somewhat poor in comparison with 
industry. In our view, this implies that many of them did not explicitly process the 
arguments of the other side and, where necessary, reject them point by point. It is 
no exaggeration to assert that the NGOs — often the most vehement critics of 
representative democracy — are themselves the most diligent practitioners of the 
principle in their internal operations. A very small number of “IPR experts” in the 
world bear the brunt of criticism. Finally, there is reason to believe that only a few 
of all the participants made the effort to study the detailed argumentation surveys 
(two of twelve E-mails inserted corrections). If the condensed versions were well 
done, this shortcoming need not necessarily have implied serious omissions in 
preparing a well-considered judgment in reflective equilibrium. Nevertheless, we 
feel that some sub-controversies could be solved only by devoting a great deal of 
thought to the overall bulk of information. But the time needed obviously ex-
ceeded the time budgets of many participants. The same bottleneck was apparent 
at the final conference. The time available for discussion was not sufficient to go 
through the entire field of argumentation in detail. Finally it was necessary to rely 
on a more “holistic” procedure and to stage a brainstorming session with selection 
(see above). 
All this certainly involved losses in rationality — but not necessarily so serious that 
the outcome of the discourse could not be qualified as “more rational” than the 
starting positions of the conflict parties. In general, it can be asked how much 
detailed knowledge is needed in situations requiring action to provide adequate 
“bounded rationality” (Simon) in deciding what action to take. There may very well 
be situations in which the full load of information may be more a hindrance than a 
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help for rational decision making. The discussion of this problem must be reserved 
for later thoughts. Overall, it can tentatively be said that processes of this type 
generate enough argumentative pressure to discover consensual domains — with 
corresponding effects in the social dimension: neither were the conclusions explic-
itly rejected, nor were there demands for comprehensive minority votes, or a 
refusal to engage in discourse. But they certainly do not generate the extent of 
consensus needed for binding decisions: when in doubt, action and participation 
costs (having to waive tried-and-tested arguments/slogans and justifying this 
course vis-à-vis the organization of origin) and, not least of all, transaction costs 
(time) proved to be too high. This assessment naturally has implications for the 
role that processes of this sort can have in the constitution of governance. They 
prepare governance but are not yet themselves governance. 
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IPR Dialogue Working Group III (Access to Essential Medicines) 
 
5th Circular: 
IP Regimes and Access to Health Care, Part One 
(Rainer Döbert) 
Arguments: IP and Drug Prices  
(long version) 
 
This file contains full length arguments pertaining to the question whether IPRs 
(especially patents) will have a negative impact on access to healthcare because they 
lead to higher prices for essential medicines. We present the arguments under three 
lead questions which broadly differentiate the topics discussed by the participants and 
in the documents that have been consulted by the WZB team. The lead questions are:  
Question (1) Do patents preclude access to healthcare because they lead 
to high (unaffordable) prices for medicines in poor coun-
tries? 
 
Discussions of the relevance of patents for the prices of medi-
cines and the relative weight of patents (and patented drugs) 
among the other factors that determine access to healthcare. 
Question (2) In view of the various safeguards and supplemental strate-
gies that are available to lower drug prices and make medi-
cines affordable are compulsory licensing and parallel im-
ports the best instruments?  
 
Discussion of the options to avoid or compensate negative im-
pacts of patents on drug prices by applying the “safeguards” of-
fered within the IP-regime or by using appropriate “supple-
mental strategies”. 
Question (3) Is strong patent protection a necessary condition for having 
a pharmaceutical industry with high investment in R & D?
  
 
Discussion of the need to balance drug prices with the protec-
tion of private investment in R & D that creates new medicines 
The reasons for distinguishing these lead questions are further explained in the 
Introduction of the condensed version file.  
The documents consulted by the WZB team are listed in the appendix at the end of 
this file. 
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1. Do patents preclude access to healthcare because they lead to high (unaf-
fordable) prices for medicines in poor countries? 
 
NO/not necessarily  YES 
   
a. Drug Prices and Other Factors   
1. Access to health care depends on so many 
factors (poverty, conflict, inequality, 
infrastructure, economic policies, infor-
mational gaps and cost/price issues) that
focusing on patent protection and pricing
would be “simplistic” (Bale, 12 ff.; WTO, 
7; M 13/14-1a, 2; Oxfam, June, 1, R5:1). 
4. States’ economic failures are the main
cause of lack of access (M, 15, 103 R5:6).
4a. Successful treatment depends on new
products supported by patents (R5:9) 
4b. Industry has offered products at substan-
tially discounted prices (R5:9)  
4c. High prices or costs are an obstacle for all 
healthcare interventions, not only medi-
cines (R5:9)  
4d. Medicines are private, not public goods
(R5:9) 
 2. Patent abuse is a central obstacle to 
successful treatment (M 13/14-1a, 2). 
3. Medicines will comprise half of the 
resources of the UNAIDS global trust 
fund; the cheapest prices will “allow more 
people to be treated” (M 13/14-1a, 14; 
Oxfam, 2001, Montreux 13/14, 227). 
5. High price of drugs is one of the main 
factors causing poor households to avoid 
seeking treatment (Oxfam, 2001, 13). 
6. Prices and infrastructure interact: only 
after “drastic dropping prices” did it make 
sense to build up the “the infrastructure 
which is necessary” (M, 13/14, 361); in 
South Africa government hasn’t had an 
intelligent response to treatment . . . be-
cause until now there haven’t been new 
options (best prices) to that; now, “. . . we 
eventually force the government to bring 
treatment into the public sector . . .” (M, 
13/14, 154 ff.). 
8. Even when generic versions of drugs are
available, access may be poor in some 
countries regardless of status of patents
(India, Africa) (Bale 15; WHO-WTO, 8, 
R5:4, R5:9). So the price differentials
between India and Pakistan as reported by
Oxfam (2001) (up to factor 14) existed
although both countries “excluded phar-
maceuticals from patent protection in the
relevant period” (WTO, 7). 
 7. One cannot lump all poor countries 
together: South Africa and Russia “strug-
gle to treat multi-drug resistant TB”, but 
the necessary medicines are patented and 
unaffordable (M 13/14-1a, 14). 
8a. Patients not suffering from drug resistant
TB are also not treated (R5:9). 
9. South Africa is not such a poor country
that it can’t afford medicines . . . the de-
fense expenses of South Africa are much
higher than its health expenses (M, 13/14, 
96 ff.). The problem is, that the poorest
continent has “the greatest member of 
armed conflicts” (M, 15, 1374)—and all 
this holds for many developing countries
with priorities on “military budgets” (Ox-
fam II, 2). 
 10. South Africa is one of the most unequal 
societies with much poverty and unem-
ployment (M, 13/14, 146). 
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NO/not necessarily  YES 
   
b. Price Effects of Patents   
11. In South Africa, the public sector prices
were lower than the quoted retail phar-
macy prices (M, 13/14, 182 f), according
to ability to pay. 
11a. Selected use of statistics attempting to
link unrelated facts (patents – access) 
(R5:9). 
 14. There is “overwhelming evidence that 
with generic competition drug prices fall 
substantially . . . This will result in more 
people gaining access to essential 
HIV/AIDS medicines . . .” (M 13/14-1a, 
10/11;): South Africa with strong patent 
protection treats 10 000 HIV patients; 
Brazil, via the production of generic an-
tiretrovirals, over 100,000 (M 13/14-1a, 
12; cf. Bale 11/6; WTO 6; Oxfam 2001, 
12, 26 ff.). 
12. The final retail prices include taxes and
distribution costs which may make up to
80% of the consumer price (WTO 5;
Montreux, 15, 1359). 
13. On the whole “countries with intellectual
property protection did not have higher
prices than countries without such pro-
tection” (Bale, 15). 
13a. Generics companies don’t spend billions
on R & D (R5:9) 
 15. Estimates of price reductions induced by 
generic competition range between 40% 
and more than 80% in the USA; simula-
tions for Argentina and India yield a 
highest possible increase of 200-300% by 
the introduction of product patents 
(WTO, 7; cf. Oxfam II, 19, factor 3 or 4). 
16. The possibility of charging higher prices 
“is essential to the patent rights” 
(Montreux, C., 385). 
c. Off-patent Drugs and Competition   
17. Most essential drugs for developing
countries are off-patent (Bale, 15; WTO
6/7). The same holds for developed coun-
tries. The IP discussion “is irrelevant on
that” (Montreux, 15, 1354). 
 18. With the spread of drug resistance and 
with new drugs appearing the number of 
essential, patented products will grow . . . 
When people’s lives are at stake five 
percent (patented drugs) is five percent 
too many (Oxfam, 2001, 25). 
20. “Patented drugs face competition from
off-patent products”—sometimes after
one year (Bale, 16) and “few patented
drugs have no effective substitutes (me-
too drugs, WTO 6, R5:6) 
 19. There is a natural tendency of people to 
stop treatment, when they feel better 
(R5:9). Higher prices propel failure to 
complete treatment, which, in turn, “con-
tributes to the spread of drug resistance” 
(Oxfam, II, 3). This holds all the more so, 
since most medicines are paid “out of 
pockets” in developing countries (Oxfam, 
II, 2). 
21. HIV is a special case (new disease, new
drugs; Montreux, 13/4, 322 ff.; 15, 1421; 
that afflicts not all poor countries (WTO
6, 96); therefore, it should not lead to a
change of the whole TRIPS 
 22. Price comparisons “demonstrate 
monopolistic pricing practices”. Compe-
tition by substitutes is limited since 
“medicines” in the same antiretroviral 
class have different properties (different 
allergic reactions, different resistance 
patterns, M 13/14-1a, 14). 
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NO/not necessarily  YES 
   
23. A drug, even a generic one cannot be
“affordable” to everyone as long as in-
comes are unequally distributed! Special 
means (funds) must be developed to im-
prove access for the poorest population
(Bale, 12, 15/16; Montreux, 13/4, 419 ff.; 
15, 1755). 
  
24. “If we go on opposing civil society
interests and the patients and the indus-
try . . . front to front . . . we will go no-
where; we will not find a solution . . . We 
have to introduce a third party . . . public 
money . . . like the Kofi Annan Funds. If
there is . . . a new possibility to involve
the industry . . . and to make a deal on
prices and . . . the more public money will 
come to buy medicines the cheaper the
medicines will be” (M, 14, 1367 ff.). 
  
25. [See below arguments nos. 26-72 
(“safeguards”, especially differential
pricing)] 
  
2. In view of the various safeguards and supplemental strategies that are 
available to lower drug prices and make medicines affordable are compul-
sory licensing and parallel imports the best instruments? 
 
YES  NO/not necessarily 
   
a. Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Imports   
26. There is overwhelming evidence that only
CL and PI guarantee affordable prices in
the long run (cf. M 13/14-1a, 10). In
South Africa, prices dropped only after
the government talked about CL and
under pressure of offers from Indian
companies (cf. M 13/14-1a, 17). This
shows that “a lot can be done” by “just
applying the safeguards (M, 2A, 276). 
 27. But CL is an exception (M, 13/14, 525) 
bound to “national emergency”, a diffi-
cult last resort (Oxfam, II, 27) from which 
“developing countries cannot derive ad-
vantage”; this is because they do not have 
an “advanced pharmaceutical industry” 
and there are difficult procedural precon-
ditions (Oxfam, II, 27). 
27a. CL was not necessary in developed 
countries to overcome health crises; in 
developing countries one main obstacle, 
lack of distribution, would still exist 
(R5:4)  
28. “When the TRIPS agreement is inter-
preted . . . exceptions conferred under the
TRIPS agreement should be interpreted in
a broad manner” (M, B, 19 ff.)—and this 
is a realistic option (Correa, 2000). 
  
APPENDIX I 
 – 76 –
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29. In this respect, it is unacceptable that
there has been a lot of pressure from in-
dustry and governments to prevent CL
and PI (TRIPS plus) (M 13/14-1a 9, 17; 
M, 2B, 40, 207 ff.)—culminating in a
new bilateralism with highest IPR stan-
dards (M, 2A, 379 ff.; Grain, July 2001). 
 30. The European Commission is not 
“preventing anybody from using compul-
sory licenses . . . The TRIPS agree-
ment . . . says that you can issue compul-
sory licenses for any reason . . . (in this 
respect the Commission has moved in the 
last 18 months)” (M, 15, 683 ff.). 
  31. Industry does not say “don’t use CL. 
Let’s be honest, which country has al-
ready used CL . . . although they had the 
right to do so?” (M, 15, 613 ff.) CL “has 
not been very much used. It’s not a good 
instrument. Normally you should find a 
solution by negotiation . . . maybe it’s a 
question of how to practice it” (M, 3A, 
217 ff.). 
32. “The grounds on which this [CL] can be
done are not limited by the agreement
(WTO, 26) and there is no reference to
“exceptional circumstances” or “emer-
gencies” in the agreement (M, 2B,
207 ff.; cf. Correa, 2000, 20).  
 33. Article 31 of TRIPS (reprinted in Oxfam, 
II, 48) states on CL, among other things, 
that one may circumvent getting a volun-
tary license “in case of a national emer-
gency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency” or “in cases of public non-
commercial use”, “predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market”. These 
reasons are mentioned “to illustrate the 
type of grounds that may be applied” 
(Correa, 2000, 20). 
  34. CL “is presented within TRIPS (not as a 
routine situation . . . there are quite a lot 
of conditions” (M, 15, 819 ff.). It’s no 
problem when a government gives a CL 
to a manufacturer who then sells to the 
public health facilities to distribute his 
products “for free”. “I have more diffi-
culties with . . . the government saying, I 
do not want to put a coin of money in this 
particular drug . . . I will give a license to 
a producer . . . I see a government which 
would have created a competitor for me 
and then I wonder is it a fair competitor” 
(no “upper costs”; M, 15, 911 ff.). 
36. “Governments will be unable to raise
enough money; that is why the private
sector is essential to this as well”; by CL
“prices will go low enough . . . so that 
thousands . . . will be able to afford those 
medicines” (M, 15, 973 ff.). Low prices
should “[also cover] not-for-profit pro-
viders and employers of large numbers of
low-income workers” (WHO/WTO, April
2001, 9). 
 35. When a third party (public money) is 
introduced “the cheaper the medicines 
will be” (M, 15, 1386 f.). 
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37. CL should be used in the USA too (M,
13/14, 670). 
 38. Unrestricted CL will drive “prices down 
to marginal costs or close to marginal 
costs (M, 13/14, 687 ff. “So the question 
is, in the existing system where you have 
a private sector . . . doing R & D, if you 
were to drive prices down to cost in all 
markets would you expect them to do 
R & D? . . . It’s not realistic” (M, 13/14, 
721 ff.). 
39. “We have never asked a company to
reduce its price to cost price” (M, 13/14,
1110 ff.); they should have a “5% roy-
alty” (M 13/14-1a, 2) and there should be
a 1% R & D tax on all generics. 
 38a. 5% royalties would not sustain R & D of 
50 billion a year (R5:9) 
38b. CL and PI must be continued with other 
measures and there must be a spectrum of 
application of IPRs—from strict to lenient 
in accordance with economic devel-
opment (R5:12)  
41. [Product quality] is a problem of
enforcement and control that should not
affect patent legislation (M, 13/14, 1146).
42. Patent protection may even “act as an
incentive to counterfeiting” (high prices:
Oxfam, 2001, 24) 
 40. CL and PI are “no magic policy potion” 
(Bale, 7 ff.): licensees may “lack skills in 
manufacturing an equally safe and effec-
tive product”; PI “increases opportunities 
for counterfeit and substandard products” 
(Bale, 18). 
40a. Counterfeit generics are probably more 
common than of branded products (R5:9)  
44. [CL has influence on prices; see above
arguments no. 26] 
 43. Governments use CL and PI “as industrial 
policy, not “as a pro-consumer tool”: 
benefits accrue mainly to copiers and 
traders, not to patients (Bale, 8, 18, R5:4). 
46. Illegal exports are manageable (Oxfam
2001). 
 45. In the developing countries there is “a lot 
of criminal energy and we see a lot… of 
pharmaceutical products… being shipped 
elsewhere. They are not kept in the coun-
try where the need is, but they are shipped 
to the [developed] world to make some 
people rich in these countries. And this is 
a point which all these pharmaceutical 
organizations drives crazy . . . (M, 3A, 
226 ff.). 
47a. Without CL government would not have
had enough bargaining power (M, 15,
844) and it would not be possible to de-
termine the lowest prices (R5:5). 
 47. It’s a false assumption that CL will result 
in much cheaper medicines; there are new 
much lower prices without CL (M, 15, 
1108; cf. differential prices) or modifying 
the patent status of products (R5:4)  
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YES  NO/not necessarily 
   
b  Voluntary Licensing and Funding   
49  Should these voluntary licenses also be
“for use in the industrialized world”? (M,
13/14, 459) 
50. Giving patents to the WHO . . . could be a
solution not always working. In the case
of Eflornithin against sleeping sickness
“even by giving the patent rights to
WHO, it was not possible to find a ge-
neric producer in any kind of country”
(M, 13/14, 478 ff.). Production was re-
sumed only after another application
(cream) had been found. (letter from In-
dustry) and it had been included into a
humanitarian program (R5:4)  
 48. “I don’t know what goes through your 
head that you are sitting here having a 
discussion about [this] narrow intellectual 
property interest, this commercial inter-
est, while there is just an overriding pub-
lic health disaster . . . It’s insane!” (M, 
13/14, 501) “It will be much more useful 
for the industry to say . . . there are indeed 
questions . . . where the compulsory li-
censing is the proper [instrument]” (M, 
13/14, 531 ff.). “Why doesn’t the industry 
just license the drugs to WHO—
voluntarily licenses them to anyone who 
wants to use them; end this discussion on 
HIV/AIDS and then have a more serious 
discussion of what proper policies are”? 
(M 13/14, 453 ff.) “That is a completely 
separate issue to what we are dealing with 
here” (587). 
51. The IP system and commercial system
actually requires the existence of a mar-
ket. And, in many countries there simply
is no market . . . There should be proba-
bly some kind of equivalent to the Food
Aid Program . . . If you want to have
long-term research in tropical diseases
without markets, we need to have a public
funding system (M, 13/14, 565 ff. 628 ff.; 
cf. Oxfam, 2001, 44) or a public private
partnership (R5:9) 
52. “We are starting to make the links
between commercial law standards with
the Human Rights . . . And inevitably the
question comes up, if the global commu-
nity is prepared to pay for it, and how you
will organize it (M, 13/14, 639 ff.). 
 51a. Public private partnership bear little 
relation to the scale of the problem (Ox-
fam 2001) 
54. “The big legal issue . . . has [become]
what is compensation—how much will
that cost” (M, 15, 844 ff.). 
55. “It will be coming close to voluntary
licensing then” (M, 13/14, 551). 
 53. On this basis [CL clearly admissible], one 
could have “a more serious and focused 
discussion of how can compulsory licens-
ing be done, or should be done, because it 
can be done whenever. When should it be 
done and what are the terms . . . to make 
it fair toward the brand name industry as 
well as toward public health?” (M, 13/14, 
538 ff.) 
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YES  NO/not necessarily 
   
c. Differential Pricing   
57. “What argument I am hearing from the
pharmaceutical companies is, ‘don’t exer-
cise your rights on compulsory licenses;
do it our way; do it [the] differential pric-
ing way.’ . . . That is not as sustainable as 
doing it the way we want to do it” (CL)
(M, 15, 613 ff.). 
 56. A global system of differential pricing 
would be a better solution than compul-
sory licensing “because we can have all 
actors—private actors, public actors—
together to set up such a system (M, 15, 
539 ff., 701). 
58. Differential pricing would also apply to 
generics (M, 15, 1290). 
59. “We don’t know what the supply is [that
is] going to be sustained over
time” (M, 15, 1256); and differential
pricing “leaves us open to being
manipulated by the companies” (M,
15, 1280)—“It’s an attractive offer, 
but it’s a short-term offer.” 
 60. A global system of differential prices 
would be “more efficient than individual 
negotiations on products with companies” 
(M, 15, 1245 ff.); and “if you sign an 
agreement it’s . . . an obligation” (M, 15, 
1260). 
  61. There could be a “WHO sponsored 
worldwide classification of markets . . . 
with guidelines for pricing” (Oxfam, 
2001, 37). 
62. “Experiences . . . show that reductions of 
90% or more below developed country 
prices can be possible through bulk pur-
chasing, competitive tenders and skillful 
negotiation” 
64. But, in parts of the world market 
“separability is breaking down. Price
regulation of pharmaceuticals is increas-
ingly based . . . on international price
comparisons—including developing
country prices” (WHO, WTO, April
2001, 23). 
65. Until the early 80s, companies had tiered
prices—until they “got beaten up in Con-
gress for this supposed discrimination
against American children” (letter from
Industry II). 
63. Differential pricing and CL and PI—to 
the extent that they depend on price dif-
ferences—presuppose conditions that 
must be guaranteed also politically; to be 
compatible with R & D, “market seg-
mentation” is required; “resale from low-
priced markets to high-priced markets 
must be constrained” (WTO, 11, cf. Ox-
fam, 2001, 24, R5:9).  
65a.  A general policy would not be workable,
among other things, for anti trust reasons
(R5:4).  
 66 Differential pricing could theoretically 
imply a win-win situation for sellers and 
for consumers in poor countries if previ-
ously the price of pharmaceuticals was 
"set with only the conditions in the 
wealthier markets taken into account" (cf. 
WTO12.13). This implicitly assumes that 
diversion to other markets and "interna-
tional reference pricing" (i.e. where prices 
in poorer countries are used as reference 
in wealthier countries) can be prevented. 
APPENDIX I 
 – 80 –
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d. Differential Filing (Lanjouw Proposal∗)   
67. This suggestion, implying “drastic
changes to the legal basis for patenting”
(letter from IND), is not “sustainable”
because it “risks destroying the incentive
system” of patents by making it “harder
to forecast investment risk, at a time
when . . . an unfettered global market is
critical to the industry’s long-term capac-
ity to spend on research” (dependency on
few blockbusters). 
67a. Differential filing presupposes market
segmentation (R5:4)  
69 “Patent changes alone [do not] hold a
solution to the access problem”—as can 
be learned from India, where, without
patent protection, access “is as bad as
anywhere in the world” (letter from IND).
70 The pro-patent industry also leads to
“developing drugs relevant to third world 
diseases”. More needs to be done. “But
the focus here is on building [together
with the WHO] an approach around a
combination of tax credits, regulatory
changes and market-based incentives,
[rather] than on drastic changes to the
legal basis for patenting (2, letter from
IND). 
71. “Those who would benefit most from the
Lanjouw proposal, the generic producers,
are not actively engaged in supplying
drugs for poor consumers” (letter from
IND), 2). 
72. The “proposal contradicts basic elements
of US law” and with Article 27 of the
TRIPS Agreement (letter from IND, 3). 
 .68 Even more efficient and sustainable than 
CL or differential pricing may be a sug-
gestion by Lanjouw: differential filing. 
For drugs against global diseases preva-
lent in all countries (e.g., HIV, cancer, 
heart disease), profits realized in rich 
countries suffice as incentives for R & D; 
therefore companies can file only “in rich 
countries coupled with unrestricted com-
petition by generic drug makers in poor 
ones” (letter from Industry II). This can 
be done by couching the “foreign filing 
license” appropriately. For drugs against 
specific diseases, prevalent in poor coun-
tries only, stronger patent protection may 
be necessary to spur invention. 
3. Is strong patent protection a necessary condition for having a pharmaceuti-
cal industry with high investment in R & D? 
To deny explicitly the necessity of pharmaceutical research and the requisite funding 
would be a position of apparent thoughtlessness, and that is why nobody holds it. 
There is controversy about the fine tuning of the system of research funding and IPR 
protection in connection with imperatives of industrial development. Questions 
arising pertain to the form of IPR protection (a) in the context of different stages of 
                                                 
∗The Lanjouw proposal was published after “Montreux”; the WBCSD introduced it together with some comments of 
the industry. We take this as a valuable contribution. 
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industrial development, (b) in view of considerations of public health and a consider-
able share of public funding, and (c) taking account of neglected diseases prevalent in 
poor countries. Further, the pharmaceutical industry’s profits were such that the need 
for strengthening and globalizing IPR protection is not self-evident. These topics 
“generated” the following set of pro and contra arguments.  
 
YES  NO/not necessarily 
   
73. Patents are more important for the
pharmaceutical industry than for any
other industry because of the enormous
and risky investments going into the de-
velopment of new products (Bale, 5; M
13/14-1b, M, R5:6) and because copying
final products is “always relatively easy”
(R5:6). 
73a. Very little of total costs for R & D comes 
from the public sector (R5:9). 
 74. The risks cannot be as high as depicted: 
the pharma industry is the most profitable 
industrial sector (Oxfam, 2001, 31); 
“claims about research costs of new drugs 
are frequently exaggerated”; “a great deal 
of research into drugs is funded by gov-
ernments, charities and tax breaks (Ox-
fam, 2001, 31, cf. M 13/14-1a, 15). In 
view of all this, patent protection is “ex-
cessive” (M 13/14-1a, 15). 
75. Countries without product patents cannot
and do not develop new drugs. Since
Canada, for example, repealed its CL
policy, “increases in investments in
R & D . . . have been dramatic” (Bale, 9).
A comparable shift may be observed in
India (M, 2 B, 91 ff.), that begins to take
advantage of product patents, because
“opportunities are emerging . . . as the
competitive situation . . . ability of a
country is changing” (M, 2 B, 123). 
 76. But India had comparatively weak patent 
protection (only processes) and built up 
“a tremendous capacity” to “reverse-
synthesize any drug (M, 2 B, 112 ff.). 
“There’s a need for looking at contingent 
conditions under which different kinds of 
IP systems would be appropriate for pro-
viding different kinds of incentives” (M, 
2 B, 126 f.). Thus, as a “by-product of 
compulsory licenses . . . some developing 
countries will develop stronger generic 
pharmaceutical industries” (M 13/14-1a, 
11). In general the balance between patent 
protection, safety regulations and access 
to medicines may be different for devel-
oped and developing countries (R5:8). 
77. Developing countries with strong patent 
protection will also benefit “especially in
terms of attracting investment” (Bale,
5)—at least once the provisions are in
force long enough. Now “it’s probably
too early to make that assessment . . . the 
provisions are not yet operational” (M,
2 A, 260 ff.). 
77a. Only a few countries will be able to
compete with countries like India and
China (R5:9).  
78. There is little evidence of an increase in 
investments; instead there are de-invest-
ments and closing of plants (M, 2B, 
27 ff.) as can be learned from Chile 
(R5:9). 
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YES  NO/not necessarily 
   
79. There will be a “globalization of the
effort to find cures for disease, spreading
the effort to countries that have core sci-
entific skills but previously lacked the
incentives.” This is important especially
“for diseases such as malaria and TB that
have been ‘neglected’ in drug develop-
ment” (Bale, 6/7). Without patent protec-
tion, money will be allocated elsewhere
“to the detriment of those suffering from
unmet medical conditions” (R5:4). 
 80. South Africa “offers an excellent 
counterexample”. It has had a strong 
patent system, suffers from a TB and 
malaria problem, but “no new medi-
cines . . . have been developed in the last 
thirty years” (M 13/14-1a, 12). This is 
because “developing countries do not 
have wealthy enough markets . . .” (M 
13/14-1a, 12) and this will not be changed 
by patent protection (Oxfam 2001).  
81. “The patent system, while a necessary
condition for much R & D, . . . [is] not a 
sufficient one to secure adequate R & D 
into the neglected diseases of the poor”
(WHO/WTO, 5). The IP system as part of
the commercial system can work only on
the basis of markets (M, 13/14, 565 ff.). 
Where these do not exist, “additional
measures of support for such R & D are 
necessary” (WHO/WTO, 5). And could
be granted a.o. in the form of biodiversity
credits (R5:1)  
 82. Intellectual property rights do not have to 
rely on “exclusion of rights” but may be 
framed as a “right to compensation” that 
protects “investment” (e.g., copyright) 
(M, 3 A, 135, 170 ff.), for example, by a 
5% royalty and a 1% tax on generics 
(R5:5). 
83. Cf. argument no. 38: An unrestricted use
of the safeguards would drive prices to
marginal costs without compensation for
R & D and generic competition could
have the same effect (R5:9)  
 84. “During the 80s and 90s the pharmaceuti-
cal industry . . . was one of the most prof-
itable industries . . . [although] patents 
were not recognized for pharmaceutical 
products in many developing coun-
tries . . . What is it now that is so impor-
tant for the companies to get every little 
company to grant patents and base in-
come on the system of those patents?” 
(M, 13/14, 847 ff.) There is “[no need] to 
get this additional income in order to 
sustain the sector ‘development’ and to 
sustain profitability” (M, 13/14, 1017 f.). 
Developed countries can absorb high 
prices, but not developing countries. A 
uniform system will not increase reve-
nues, but limit access to healthcare for the 
poor (Oxfam 2001) 
85. “There is no need [to take additional
income] from the least developed coun-
tries” (Ramsey pricing!) (M, 13/14,
1021). But countries “that are intermedi-
ately rich may contribute to R & D” (M, 
13/14, 1087); they have “effective local
producers . . . which will potentially rep-
resent a significant competition and . . . 
competition should be directed at R & D 
in new areas . . .” (M, 13/14, 980 ff.). 
 86. It can’t be true that “the whole budget 
for . . . is broken down and the future of 
the industry is at risk” if one developing 
country grants a compulsory license; 
there must be other reasons for expanding 
the IP system (M, 13/14, 1038 ff.), for 
instance, “to acquire a higher share of the 
market” in view of “a higher demand for 
medicines in developing countries” (M, 
13/14, 889), or just to have “more in-
come”, which is “reason enough for busi-
ness” (M, 13/14, 1029).  
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YES  NO/not necessarily 
   
87. An increasing number of competitors
are—in these countries—producing not
only for the local market but also for
other markets, and it’s much easier to
stop illegal actions . . . [by filing] in the
origin (M, 13/14, 950 ff.). And “there was 
factual evidence that there was a lot of
reproduction . . . of drugs which were of
low quality and actually harmed.” 
 88. Counterfeiting is a problem of control, 
not IPR (M, 13/14, 1162 ff.). 
89. There is a “competitive situation for
Western producers on these markets”; 
you have to “discipline—to extend the
disciplines in the competitive environ-
ment among the industrialized country
producers” (M, 13/14, 1058 ff.). 
  
90. It has been shown empirically that “when
profits rise, R & D rises; when profits 
fall, R & D falls . . . increased profits . . . 
will go into R & D to the extent . . . that 
profits will go” (M, 13/14, 1188 ff.). But 
you don’t know for what diseases,
whether they are relevant diseases—all 
those questions still remain (1207). 
 91. There is no guarantee that this additional 
income will be devoted to R & D (M, 
13/14, 11=1). 
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http://www.oxfam.org.uk/cutthecost/policy3.rtf 
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Cut the Cost, n.d., http://www.oxfam.org.uk/cutthecost/patent.pdf 
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WTO, Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs, Background 
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hosbjor/wto_background_e.doc 
WHO-WTO, More Equitable Pricing for Essential Drugs: What do we mean and what are 
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hosbjor/equitable_pricing.doc 
WHO-WTO, Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs, Execu-
tive Summary of Report, April 2001, 
http://www.who.int/medicines/library/edm_general/who-wto-hosbjor/hosbjorexe-
eng.pdf 
APPENDIX II 
Circular 8: The Argumentation 
(long version) 
 
 
 
 – 85 –
IPR Dialogue Working Group III (Access to Essential Medicines) 
8th Circular: 
Part Two: Access to Health Care and IPRs — The Normative Issues 
(Rainer Döbert, 02-01-02) 
 
Arguments: Access to Healthcare and IPRs — 
The Normative Issues 
 
(long version) 
 
This file contains full length arguments pertaining to normative issues that raised 
with respect to the legitimacy and justification of IPR regimes (especially patents) 
and the TRIPS Agreement. The leading question is whether existing IPR regimes 
(and TRIPS) must be revised or supplemented in order to provide respect for human 
rights, moral values and norms of justice and fairness. We survey the arguments of 
the participants and the documents consulted under three more specific questions:  
1. Do patents on essential medicines violate the human right of access to 
healthcare? 
2. Do companies have moral obligations to contribute to the solution of 
the health crisis in developing countries? 
3. Is the IPR system (TRIPS) flawed because injustice and unfairness are 
built into it? 
The reasons for distinguishing these questions are further explained in the Introduc-
tion of the condensed version file.  
The documents consulted by the WZB team are listed in the addenum at the end of 
this file. 
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Must Existing IPR Regimes (and TRIPS) be modified/rejected 
for Normative Reasons? 
1. Do patents on essential medicines violate the human right of access to 
healthcare?  
 
Issues Pro Contra 
Strict 
(enforceable) 
vs. condi-
tional human 
rights 
1. Access to healthcare (including 
medicines) is a basic human right 
that “should have higher status 
than international trade agree-
ments” [which require IPR protec-
tion]. (M 13/14-1a 4) 
2. The addressee of the human right 
of access to healthcare are States 
(governments), not private compa-
nies (M 13/14-1a 4; M15/276, 
1400). And the obligations of 
States are conditional on “resource 
constraints applying within the 
country”. (M 13/14-1a 7, 11, 15, 
156) 
  2a. There is no “right of access to 
health care” but a “right to a stan-
dard of living adequate …” (Art 
25.1 Univ. Declaration of Human 
Rights) (R8:2) 
 4. The right of access to healthcare 
implies a duty of States to create 
“conditions which would assure to 
all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness” 
(M 13/14-1a 4). This duty is strict 
with respect to a “minimum core 
obligation”. (M 13/14-1a 7) 
3. Access to medicines is an “aspira-
tional right, not a fundamental 
right” (M 13/14-1b). One must 
distinguish human rights which 
can be enforced vis-à-vis govern-
ments from other human rights 
(social rights), which are (less 
binding) policy goals. “All over 
the world … governments have not 
… treated the rights to food and 
health as true [strict] human rights. 
Overstressing [social rights] claims 
runs the risk of strangling the sys-
tems”. (M15/236) 
Obligations 
under TRIPS 
and human 
rights 
5. “There is a pressing constitutional 
obligation on the State to take all 
measures at its disposal to reduce 
the price of [essential] drugs”—
“even if this means breaking the 
TRIPS Agreement” (M 13/14-1a 
6/7). 
 
 6. The legitimacy of IPRs is 
questionable also because the most 
important measures States may 
possibly take to reduce drug prices, 
namely compulsory licensing (CL) 
and parallel imports (PI), are being 
denied and undermined by many 
forms of pressure and TRIPS-Plus 
legislation (M 13/14-1a 9, 10; cf. 
also 5th Circular). 
7. CL and PI, properly applied, are 
legitimate options under TRIPS 
and are beginning to be fully ac-
cepted. (see below no. 45). Little 
TRIPS-Plus legislation is being 
advocated and TRIPS-Minus is 
designed to foster industrial devel-
opment, not access to healthcare 
(R8:5)  
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Issues Pro Contra 
Medicines as 
private goods 
 8. If companies have obligations it is 
„not because there are rights to 
medicines and not because medi-
cines are a public good“ 
(M15/354). “Goods and services 
which may be used to produce a 
public good are thereby not them-
selves public goods. … The sup-
pliers [of medicines] … to a health 
program are providing private 
goods to a purchaser who may then 
supply a public good …” (M 
13/14-1b). Hence, if the private 
goods (medicines) are to become 
part of a public good like equal 
access to essential medicines the 
respective policy objective has to 
be defined and health promotion 
programs have to be set up (M 
13/14-1b). 
IPRs and the 
public 
interest 
affordable 
medicines
9. The patent system has to further 
the public interest while at the 
same time “fairly rewarding inno-
vators”. “The public interest is 
served by ensuring access to essen-
tial drugs for all, not just for the 
wealthy or those with drug insur-
ance. If people do not have access 
to life-saving drugs it does not 
make sense to provide incentives 
for their innovation” (M 13/14-1a 
10). In this respect one may plau-
sibly “question the economic, 
social and political foundations of 
the TRIPS Agreement“, i.e., its 
legitimacy. (M 13/14-1a 9) 
10. A drug or any other health 
intervention cannot be “affordable 
to everyone as long as incomes are 
unequally distributed” (Bale 12). 
Governments can not always 
deliver. Special measures/pro-
grams are needed to provide access 
to medicines for the poorest popu-
lations (cf. below nos. 23,26, R8:4, 
R8:5) 
 9a. IPRs are a question of a delicate 
balance between public and pri-
vate interests that must be adapted 
to each country. The current sys-
tem seems to favour too much 
private interests (R8:4).  
11. The public goods provided 
through the patent system are 
information and research and 
development (derived from M 
13/14-1b), not private, physical 
goods (R8:5).  
 
 12. “Nobody will discuss [deny] that 
medicines as such, the physical 
product, are a private good. The 
problem is that the information 
that allows you to produce these 
medicines is a public good”. 
(M15/368, 374) 
13. “We all know that intellectual 
property is a restriction on the 
public good quality” [of informa-
tion] (M15/447) 
  13a. Public sector research rarely 
results in a medicine (R8:5)  
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Issues Pro Contra 
Human rights 
and property 
rights 
15. “[Human] rights suggests gener-
ally some kind of higher standard. 
… [To put them on the same level 
as property rights] is a wrong 
conception. … These [latter] 
rights are really [a] social crea-
tion”. (M2A/342) 
14. The protection of property, 
including intellectual property, is 
a human right, too (Art. 17.2 and 
27.2 of the Univ. Declaration of 
Human Rights, R8:2), and “prop-
erty rights are an enormously 
important element of the rule of 
law”. (M2A/251) 
 15a. Citizens of developed countries 
would not allow governments to 
respect patent rights if that meant 
death of 10 to 25 percent of the 
population (R8:3) 
14a. Respecting and enforcing human 
rights cannot be done by under-
mining other similarly basic hu-
man rights (R8:2). 
 16. “Property rights and human rights 
are two totally different systems 
that should not be subsumed un-
der one umbrella. … Belonging to 
the human kind you have some 
inalienable rights. That … is not 
addressed by the TRIPS regime. 
This is [only] a regime of exclu-
sivity”. (M2A/342, 356) 
17. “Let us not argue over the fact 
that societies have evolved 
mechanisms of exclusion from 
privately produced knowledge … 
even from public domain knowl-
edge … [Also in the case when] 
you want benefits to be given to 
communities and individuals who 
have produced traditional knowl-
edge then you must accept that 
there must be [exclusion] certain 
rights. … Rights can only exist by 
exclusion”. (M2B/150, 176) 
 18. “What property is being created 
by somebody advancing knowl-
edge, for instance in drug manu-
facturing? There is no property 
being created, so there are no 
property rights”. (M2A/342) 
 
The analogy 
of the inter-
national 
undertaking  
19. The International Undertaking for 
genetic resources demonstrates 
that public benefits result from 
having less IP protection, namely: 
“free access to new varieties as a 
benefit for the whole society”. (M 
2B/186) 
19a. This is a static argument around 
currently existing technology 
(R8:5). State-run approaches to 
innovation do nor work (R8:5)  
The scope of 
a human 
right to 
essential 
medicines  
The need to 
sustain the 
funding of 
R & D of new 
medicines 
 20. “If we agree that there is the basic 
human right of access to essential 
medicines…where do we draw 
the line? Would you also argue 
that there is a basic human right to 
have access to the latest technol-
ogy on cancer drugs …? So the 
question is where to draw the line 
and how can we find the proper 
tools … [such] that there is re-
search and development done on 
these drugs” (M15/574). 
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Issues Pro Contra 
  21. “You can’t address the [relation 
of] human rights standards and 
commercial law properly without 
looking into the funding struc-
tures” [for R & D that provides 
new medicines]. (M 13(14)/609) 
Indirect con-
tributions of 
the private 
sector to 
social human 
rights: The 
crucial role of 
governmental 
action  
 22. “If we design [access to medi-
cines] as a human rights issue and 
actually engage the private sector, 
we have to redo the whole debate. 
…To what extent are companies 
actually bound by the human 
rights standards other than 
through their own governments? 
… It’s a question of how do we 
fund the whole thing. … You can 
actually justify human rights obli-
gations with governments’ fund-
ing efforts and the rights then 
being realized by private actions 
as well”. (M 15/504) 
2. Do companies have moral obligations to contribute to the solution of the 
health crisis in developing countries?  
 
Issues Pro Contra 
The case for 
a direct con-
tribution of 
the private 
sector to 
social human 
rights: The 
moral duty to 
help 
23. Even if one agrees that it is gov-
ernments who are responsible for 
realizing human rights, one may 
raise the question, “whether the 
companies should … contribute to 
health needs which would under 
any definition of human rights be 
the minimum standard”. 
(M15/518). 
 
Obligations to 
“care” 
24. Companies see themselves as part 
of social and economic solutions; 
they are being observed by a pub-
lic with moral convictions and run 
by employees who “are actual 
humans who do care. [Such per-
sons go] into the pharmaceuticals 
industry because they are moti-
vated by high ideals”. (M13/1245; 
M 13/14-1b) 
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Issues Pro Contra 
Commitment 
to Social 
Responsibility 
25. There are obligations of “corpo-
rate social responsibility” (Oxfam 
7); these imply “a moral duty for 
companies to provide medicines 
… in the least developed countries 
at cost prices”. (M 13/831) That is 
why companies are prepared to 
back a global system of differen-
tial pricing. (see 5th Circular)  
26. [There cannot be a duty to provide 
essential medicines at cost prices] 
for the developing countries, be-
cause the latter can be expected to 
contribute to R & D “according to 
ability to pay”. (M13/1090).  
  26a. The ideal scheme is hard to imple-
ment (R8:5)  
 27. There will be no solution for the 
health crisis in the South without 
additional public money. But this 
is “not to remove every responsi-
bility from the industries. … In-
dustry has a responsibility in the 
game, but others [do] too”. 
(M15/1380) 
 
3. Is the IPR system (TRIPS) flawed because injustice and unfairness are built 
into it?  
a. Pressure and Lack of Participation  
 
Issues Pro Contra 
Flaws in the 
TRIPS nego-
tiations?  
Because of 
pressure from 
developed 
countries
28. The negotiation process has been 
unduly influenced by “quite pow-
erful industries in the United 
States and other developed coun-
tries”. (M1/348) 
28a. Doha showed that developing 
countries do have a say. (R8:5)  
APPENDIX II 
 – 91 –
Issues Pro Contra 
Because of 
lack of equal 
participation
29. The system has to be reformed 
fundamentally—“fundamental in 
the sense that to have a global 
treaty that does not represent 
three-quarters of the world in the 
decision making is patently un-
just” (M3A/300). “The nego-
tiation was then … very non-
transparent …” between devel-
oped and developing countries; 
“the rest of the countries in fact 
almost never participated at all”—
in particular, “there was no Afri-
can input at all in this negotia-
tion”. (M3A/188, 235, 262). 
30. “Decision making in the WTO is 
generally made by consensus. … 
If somebody were to disagree, 
there is no way that that decision 
would go through. …The fact that 
developing countries were not 
widely represented …is because 
of the way it is done” [i.e., small 
groups drafting texts for larger 
groups]. “The fact that some 
countries don’t have enough ex-
pertise to get represented in these 
drafting groups etc. is another 
problem, but it’s not as if the rules 
of the WTO are somehow loaded 
against the countries” (M3A/71). 
Proof is inter alia “the flexibility 
in the TRIPS agreement” which 
“didn’t come about by sheer acci-
dent”, but by a “tough battle”. The 
same holds for the “ambiguities in 
the agreement” which leave room 
for interpretations in accordance 
with countries’ needs and inter-
ests. “And, therefore, it isn’t ex-
actly as one-sided as people think 
it is”. (M3A/84)  
 31. “It’s not due to incompetence. … 
As a matter of fact, … the CBD 
was headed by an African, and 
they did not allow us to partici-
pate. … Imagine a small country 
like Burkina Faso opposing the 
United States openly: … Burkina 
Faso’s loan [would] not be nego-
tiated … Burkina Faso [would] be 
sanctioned … made a pariah 
State” (M3A/291). “There was a 
lot of coercion also during the 
negotiation [of TRIPS]” 
(M1B/358). 
32. African delegations “never devel-
oped an interest in this question. 
… But with respect to Latin 
American and Asian countries, … 
there has been a very long process 
in the beginning”, characterized 
by “ideological debates” and 
“blockages”. And, in the end, “a 
lot of Western concepts were 
extended without having time to 
adjust them to a global situation” 
(M, 3A, 235 ff.) 
 
Because of 
uneven distri-
bution of 
expertise
33. The “issue [of IPRs] was very 
new for developing countries … 
There were no resources for a 
country like ours—and perhaps 
the same applies to African coun-
tries and many Asian countries—
to have expertise really, to have a 
real expert to discuss all these 
very difficult problems at that 
time” (M3A/195) 
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Issues Pro Contra 
Because cul-
tural differ-
ences have 
been dis-
regarded
34. “If the process is flawed, the 
product cannot be any better” 
(M3A/264). “The process is 
flawed in the sense that the whole 
cultural dimension has not been 
inputted. … As far back as 1992, 
… we did mention that there is a 
very strong problem between 
WTO, GATT, the CBD and our 
way of life. … People then as-
sumed that we [were] not right. … 
Silence to us … means you don’t 
agree, and this was the kind of 
position we took” (M3A/264) 
 
Because the 
interests of 
the West 
predominate
35. “The patent system is just one 
idea that came essentially from 
the West. … Now that it is in the 
interest of the West, patents have 
been encouraged. Very soon they 
will realize that it is no longer in 
their interest … and [they] will 
appropriate the value from other 
parts of the world: … The rest of 
the world considers this whole 
apparatus as one simple system of 
neo-colonialism”. (M3A/322) 
35a. It is no coincidence, that the 
highest level of innovation is in 
countries that reward creativity. 
(R8:5)  
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b. Inequalities and Development  
 
Issues Pro Contra 
Violation of 
the right to 
development? 
Uniform IPRs 
foreclose the 
standard 
route of copy-
ing advanced 
technology
36. TRIPS implies “the imposition of 
standards prevailing in developed 
countries on developing coun-
tries” (M1B/346), despite the fact 
that, in the area of science and 
technology, we probably face the 
most dramatic asymmetry in the 
North-South relationship 
(M1B/368). “Unlike other agree-
ments within the WTO, the 
TRIPS Agreement does not con-
tain any special or differential 
treatment for developing countries 
except the transitional periods 
which for developing countries 
have already expired and are still 
valid only for the least developed 
countries” (M1B/361). But this 
“one-size-fits-all approach” (Ox-
fam) denies the “right to devel-
opment” (M1B/391): “Industriali-
zation usually relies on reproduc-
ing the technologies of the more 
advanced economies. … By de-
priving developing countries of a 
policy instrument for promoting 
national development that they 
themselves used, the rich coun-
tries are effectively ‘pulling up the 
ladder’” (Oxfam 6, M2A/138) 
36a. The argument is false in general 
thrust, among other things be-
cause the development of an in-
digenous pharmaceutical industry 
will be the wrong way for indus-
trialization in many cases (over-
capacity competitive advantages 
of few countries, high-tech-low-
employment as characteristic of 
pharmaceutical industry) (R8:5).  
 36b. In industrial countries the intro-
duction of patents was always 
fostered by clear gains to the do-
mestic economy while in develop-
ing countries this policy was 
forced for the benefit of interna-
tional companies. “And in ad-
vanced countries public health 
goals were never under threat” (by 
patents) This is different for de-
veloping countries today (R5:8). 
 
Options for 
differential 
treatment of 
developing 
countries
37. “There is a need for looking at 
contingent conditions under which 
different kinds of IP systems 
would be appropriate” 
(M2B/125). “We have areas such 
as trade secrets and many cases 
under copyright in which the right 
is a right to a remuneration and 
not a right to exclusion”. 
(M3A/134, M2A/230) 
38. There are a number of provisions 
(safeguards) in the TRIPS Agree-
ment that provide flexibility for 
developing countries (e.g., delays 
until 2016, compulsory licenses). 
(M1B/401, see 5th Circular) 
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Issues Pro Contra 
 39. Recourse to the flexibilities 
offered by the IP system is often 
blocked through pressure from 
industrialized countries and bilat-
eralism. (M2A/3, 384, see 5th 
Circular) 
40. The WTO assembly at Doha 
reaffirmed the “right of WTO 
members to use to the full the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agree-
ment”. (WTO 2001) 
Special 
aspects of 
gene patents:
Blocking 
competition 
with generics
41. Problems are aggravated because 
“the information which is pro-
tected is unique. … There is no 
possibility at all to invent around, 
and to find something which is 
similar. So the ethical and eco-
nomic and social consequences of 
patenting genes are serious 
(M2A/25). Among other things, 
patents can be abused “to block 
genuine competition” (generic 
products)—“evergreening” on the 
basis of “very poor contributions 
to the state of the art”. (M2A/58, 
M2B/6) 
42. See 9th Circular on Gene 
Patenting 
43. Patents by definition exclude 
competition through copies of 
protected inventions. Compulsory 
licensing, while possible in prin-
ciple, can as well be abused. To 
that extent competition through 
generics constitutes unfair com-
petition. (See 5th Circular) 
 
c. Other Normative Infringements  
 
Issues Pro Contra 
Unfair bene-
fits through 
patenting? 
Discoveries
44. “One element of unfairness relates 
to the appropriation of nature” in 
the form of protecting mere “dis-
coveries which should belong to 
humanity as a whole”. (M2A/15) 
45. “There are no uniform standards” 
for inventiveness; “the line [dis-
tinguishing discovery and inven-
tion] can be drawn by the courts, 
and every country can draw its 
own lines”. (M2A/265, Correa 
2000, 19) (see 9th Circular Gen 
Patenting) 
  45a. Gene discoveries are not medicine 
innovations (R8:5) 
Lack of 
inventive 
steps
46. In addition, there is the appropria-
tion of knowledge that should 
remain in the public domain be-
cause of too little inventiveness 
(M, 2A, 58 ff.) 
47. How can TRIPS allow public 
domain “knowledge to be privat-
ized? … Once it is demonstrated 
that public domain knowledge 
existed, … one can certainly re-
voke the patent”. (M3A/326) 
 48. To revoke a patent is extremely 
costly and time consuming. 
(M4/11) 
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Issues Pro Contra 
Unequal 
acknowl-
edgement of 
inventions? 
Seed compa-
nies
vs. farmers
“Biopiracy”
49. It’s also unfair that “the seed 
companies can get benefits 
through the intellectual property 
system, [but that] this does not 
apply to the farmers [who,] in the 
first place, conserved, improved, 
and provided germ plasm [to the 
gene banks]” (M2A/47). To this 
come cases of biopiracy where 
“traditional and indigenous 
knowledge” is being appropriated. 
(M2A/47) 
 
Unkept 
promises? 
Technology 
transfer
50. There are unkept promises: 
Instead of investments and tech-
nology transfers, “the introduction 
of patents has led, in many coun-
tries, to de-investment”, and 
TRIPS will not in any way in-
crease the flow of technology 
transfer as such. (M2B/27) 
51. “Many of the provisions [of 
TRIPS] are not even in force, … 
so it’s probably too early to make 
[a negative] assessment”. 
(M2A/261) 
 50a. There are unkept promises with 
respect to textiles and agricultural 
products, too, with the effect of 
lacking reciprocity of benefits and 
uncompensated transfers of rent to 
the North (R8:5) 
 
Unequal 
access to the 
IPR system 
52. “The current system is not acces-
sible for many poor people” be-
cause “the transaction costs” (fil-
ing, disputing, enforcing) are too 
high (M3A/313, R8:6). There is 
“a huge administrative and finan-
cial burden of instituting complex 
IP systems” (Oxfam 2000, 6) 
52a. Most patents are not taken by 
“poor people” but by companies 
(R8:5)  
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Addendum: Additional documents consulted for the survey of arguments in the 
8th Circular 
Correa, Carlos (2000): Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in 
Developing Countries 
Oxfam (ed.) (2000): Fatal Side Effects. Medicine Patents under the Microscope 
